The wrong kind of general:  the resignation of union brigadier general William W. Burns by Ward, David Earl
   
 
 
THE WRONG KIND OF GENERAL:  THE RESIGNATION OF UNION BRIGADIER 
GENERAL WILLIAM W. BURNS 
 
A Thesis 
by 
DAVID EARL WARD 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
 
 
   
 
May 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject:  History 
 
   
 
 
THE WRONG KIND OF GENERAL:  THE RESIGNATION OF UNION BRIGADIER 
GENERAL WILLIAM W. BURNS 
A Thesis 
by 
DAVID EARL WARD 
Submitted to Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
Approved as to style and content by: 
   
____________________  ____________________ 
Joseph G. Dawson, III  Charles E. Brooks 
(Chair of Committee)  (Member) 
   
   
____________________  ____________________ 
Jonathan M. Smith  Walter L. Buenger 
(Member)  (Head of Department) 
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
May 2005 
 
Major Subject:  History 
 
  iii 
ABSTRACT 
The Wrong Kind of General:  The Resignation of Union Brigadier 
 General William W. Burns.  (May 2005) 
David Earl Ward, B.A., Mississippi State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Joseph G. Dawson, III 
 
This study examines the career of Union Brigadier General William Wallace 
Burns, focusing on the circumstances surrounding his mysterious resignation of his 
volunteer rank in March 1863, at the height of the Civil War.  General Burns, a rising 
star in the Army of the Potomac, seemingly assured of rapid promotion to major general, 
relinquished his field rank and returned to his Regular Army rank of major in the 
Commissary Department.  Why would a well-regarded officer, not suffering from any 
debilitating physical problems, choose to destroy his career in such a manner?  General 
Burns claimed in his personal letters that he was forced out through the duplicity of 
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton.  A War Department inquiry found no evidence to 
support Burns’ allegation.  This thesis, after a thorough examination of the subject, 
offers a conclusion as to whether General Burns was wronged or if he was the victim of 
his own paranoia.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Brigadier General William Wallace Burns needed more time.  He did not have 
the troops he needed to hold the ground he was on, yet his orders required him to make 
the attempt.  Major General George B. McClellan’s grand plan to take Richmond in the 
summer of 1862 with his Peninsular campaign had crumbled in the face of ferocious 
Confederate attacks, and the Army of the Potomac was now conducting a fighting 
withdrawal to safer ground.  Failure to check the Confederate advance here at Savage 
Station, at least temporarily, would further expose the vulnerable rear of the retreating 
Union army, a potentially disastrous development.  His three regiments were horribly 
exposed, his flanks up in the air and a dangerous gap in his center.  The regiments on 
either side of the gap were from his own Philadelphia Brigade, a unit that had suffered a 
costly defeat that ended in an embarrassing rout only a few months before.  This action 
would be their first real test since that day.  Burns could only hope that months of 
training under his watchful eye would pay off.  He nervously eyed the gap, praying that 
his promised reinforcements would arrive before the Confederates did.  A rattle of 
musketry in the woods in front of his line announced the winner of the race.  Blue-clad 
skirmishers sprinted from the woods, followed closely by hundreds of yelling rebels, 
pushing right towards the gap.  Burns exhorted his men to hold, pacing behind the line 
even after a Confederate bullet tore open his cheek, coming within inches of killing him  
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style and format of Civil War History. 
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on the spot.  As he feared, his troops could not hold the line, but they gave ground only  
grudgingly, maintaining order even as they fell back under fire.  In the end, Burns and 
his men bought just enough time for fresh Union troops to arrive and drive back the 
Confederates.1 
 War can reveal talent in warriors in a wholly unbiased manner, regardless of their 
background before the fighting starts.  Burns began the Civil War as a well-regarded 
officer in the Commissary Department, with neither combat experience nor 
demonstrated skill in leading large numbers of soldiers even in peacetime exercises, yet 
he requested a combat command early in the war and proved to be highly capable 
leading both a brigade and a division in the field.  His defense of Savage Station was the 
culmination of his learning experience as a combat leader, having taken the remnants of 
a shattered brigade and forging them into a well-disciplined fighting force that proved 
their mettle under dire circumstances in a crucial situation.  However, rather than 
heralding the arrival of a new star in the Union army, the battle proved to be the high-
water mark of a combat career cut short with no explanation after Burns submitted his 
resignation as a volunteer officer in March 1863 and returned to the Commissary 
Department. 
 Burns’ decision has provoked little curiosity from historians.  Ezra Warner 
devotes less than a page to Burns’ entry in his Generals in Blue, dismissively noting that 
“Burns evidently preferred administration to field command.”2  The entry in the 
Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War paraphrases Warner with the 
conclusion that “field command was not his preference.”3  In Who Was Who in the Civil 
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War, Stewart Sifakis decides not to even guess, noting the resignation without comment.  
A darker potential explanation arises in Allen C. Guelzo’s entry on Burns in the 
Biographical Dictionary of the Union, where he surmises that the general “refused to 
report to General William S. Rosecrans,” a theory that casts a negative light on Burns.4  
None of these historians appear to consider the possibility that there were extenuating 
circumstances involved in Burns’ resignation.5 
 Even those historians who take note of Burns’ accomplishments on the battlefield 
during the Peninsular Campaign show little curiosity about his sudden disappearance 
from the Army of the Potomac only months later.  Bradley M. Gottfried paints a highly 
complimentary, if brief, picture of Burns in Stopping Pickett:  The History of the 
Philadelphia Brigade, then allows him to vanish from the scene, noting without 
explanation that “Burns never received a second star.”6  Gary G. Lash writes favorably 
of Burns in his massive history of the California regiment, but he cannot provide any 
clues as to why the general sank into obscurity instead of going on to greater things.7  
Other historians who mention Burns at all, such as Brian K. Burton in Extraordinary 
Circumstances:  The Seven Days Battles, praise him for his conduct at Savage Station 
and then rarely, if ever, mention him again.8 
 As Burns’ papers now reveal9, the events that provoked his resignation were far 
more complicated than previously suspected.  He was convinced that political enemies 
were conspiring to keep him from promotion, in particular Secretary of War Edwin M. 
Stanton.  Burns resigned in protest, not to escape what he perceived as persecution but to 
bring the matter to Abraham Lincoln’s attention, hoping for intervention.  This thesis 
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will examine the events surrounding Burns’ sudden resignation for the first time, using 
his papers to paint the picture as he saw it and then evaluating if his version of events is 
correct.  In doing so, this thesis will provide the first study of this talented general’s 
career of more than a few paragraphs. 
 Burns considered Stanton to be his archenemy.  Therefore this thesis will 
examine the rift that existed between Stanton and a sizable number of conservative, 
West Point-educated officers in the Army of the Potomac, many of whom were friends 
and protégés of Major General George B. McClellan, placing it in the context of the 
political disagreements between the army and the government on how best to prosecute 
the war.  This environment caused officers such as Burns to become keenly aware of 
what they perceived to be political threats from above, creating a situation where malice 
could be seen in every shadow, whether it was there or not.  By presenting many of the 
factors that influenced his decision, a decision that cost the Union the services of a 
valuable combat leader at a critical point in the war, this thesis will provide the first 
informed explanation for the mysterious resignation of General Burns. 
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CHAPTER II                                                                                         
THE LONG ROAD UP 
William Wallace Burns, one of nine children for Joseph and Rebecca Lewis 
Burns, was born in Coshocton, Ohio, the county seat of rural Coshocton County, 
northeast of Columbus, on September 3, 1825.  Through his mother, a native Virginian, 
young William was a distant relation to George Washington.  Joseph Burns, also born in 
Virginia, moved to Ohio with his parents as a teenager and became a prominent local 
politician, serving in the state legislature from 1838 to 1840 and winning a seat in the 
U.S. House of Representatives as a Democrat in 1857.  The elder Burns also had a strong 
interest in military affairs and served as a major general in command of the Ohio state 
militia prior to his election to the House of Representatives.  His father’s political and 
military connections were surely influential in securing young William an appointment 
to the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, in May 1842. 1   
Burns entered as part of the largest class the academy had ever seen; one-hundred 
twenty-two applicants arrived on the banks of the Hudson River that summer.  Pressure 
began immediately, with thirty-three young men packing for home by summer’s end.  
The West Point regimen instilled in Burns a sense of discipline that would become a 
hallmark of his military career.  Cadets rose each day at dawn and fell in immediately for 
roll call; inspection followed thirty minutes later.  Breakfast was served at 7:00 a.m. and 
classes began at 8:00 a.m., held in sequence for five hours until an hour break for lunch 
at 1:00 p.m., followed by two more hours of classes.  Various forms of drill occupied the 
cadets from 4:00 p.m. to sundown at which point supper was served for an hour.  Study 
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was required until 9:30 p.m. when cadets had a half-hour of time to themselves before 
lights out at 10:00 p.m.2 
Burns adapted well to West Point’s regimentation.  His strong discipline earned 
him the right to carry the colors during the academy’s Independence Day celebration in 
1846.  For the rest of his life he would emphasize the importance of discipline for a 
soldier.  In a General Order (dated November 3, 1862) announcing that he was leaving 
his brigade in order to take up a division command, Burns implored his men “to pay 
rigid regard to discipline,” further emphasizing that “without discipline the bravest must 
yield to the basest.  General Washington wept tears of blood over this great want in his 
army . . . I beg you to remember me in your determination to do your duty . . . ”.3  He 
later explained his views on the subject of discipline in great detail: 
The patriot who rushes to the field in defence of his country follows the blind 
impulse of an honorable instinct, but the man who, in addition, subjects himself  
to the restraints of discipline, endures hardships and suffering in the thousand of 
vicissitudes which a military life in camp and in field inflicts upon an universal  
soldier, passes through the chrysalis state of manhood into the veteran defender  
of his country and her rights.  When this soldier perseveres with a single eye to  
duty, resisting alike the disloyalty and weakness of his superiors, while 
combating the open blows of his country’s foes, he becomes a ‘hero.’4 
Burns never abandoned the devotion to discipline instilled in him through his West Point 
instruction, always striving to inspire the troops under his command to the same 
devotion.5   
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Burns failed English during his first year at West Point and was required to 
repeat the year, thus extending his time at the academy to five years and forfeiting his 
chance to graduate alongside future luminaries such as George B. McClellan, Thomas J. 
Jackson, George Pickett, Samuel D. Sturgis, and George Stoneman in the famous class 
of 1846.  Burns graduated on July 1, 1847, ranked, inauspiciously, twenty-eighth in a 
class of thirty-eight, including A. P. Hill, Ambrose Burnside, John Gibbon, and Henry 
Heth.6  
 Young Burns began his military career as a brevet second lieutenant in the U.S. 
3rd Infantry Regiment in August 1847, before being promoted to second lieutenant with 
the 5th Infantry that September, under the command of Captain Caleb C. Sibley.  After 
marching from Vera Cruz to Mexico City with many of his recently graduated 
classmates, Burns was selected to serve in the military police force created for the enemy 
capital after its fall and guarded state prisoners being held in the Palace of the 
Montezumas.  With the war ended, Burns found himself spending the next five years 
(1849-54) on garrison duty at various posts in Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas, and Indian 
Territory; a promotion to first lieutenant in the 5th Infantry came in 1851.  On September 
3, 1849, while at Fort Smith, Arkansas, Burns married a daughter of John C. Atkinson, 
of Lexington, Kentucky, with whom he would have two daughters of his own.7 
 Burns first met Henry Hopkins Sibley, a distant relative of his previous 
commander, while stationed at Fort Graham, Texas (near Waco) with the 5th Infantry.  
Brevet Major Sibley was posted there as Burns’ commanding officer in 1850, an event 
that would in time prove fortuitous for the young lieutenant.  Sibley and Burns became 
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fast friends.  Sibley helped found and became president of a literary club called the 
Brazorian Society, an association of officers serving near the Brazos River who met 
periodically to present speakers and read papers.  Burns, who would prove fond of 
intellectual and literary endeavors throughout his lifetime, was almost certainly a 
member.8    
His service on the frontier concluded, Burns was assigned to Philadelphia on 
recruiting duty for the next two years (1854-56).  Evidently Burns did not find the 
intellectual aspects of this duty to be very stimulating; he occupied his spare time 
attending medical lectures and helping publish an edition of William Hardee’s manual 
on infantry tactics.9   
In late 1855 Burns was petitioned by Brevet Major Sibley for assistance in 
procuring a patent for a new tent design:  the Sibley tent.  Impressed by the warmth, 
sturdiness, and roominess of a Comanche teepee during a visit to an Indian village in 
early 1855, Sibley and his fellow officers (some of whom were members of the 
Brazorian Society) had taken the obvious advantages of the Indian shelter and drawn up 
an efficient, simple conical design for use as a new Army tent.  An assignment to help 
quell the disturbances in “Bleeding Kansas” during the winter of 1855-56 gave Sibley 
the opportunity for an extensive field test for his tent; it proved to work as well as he 
could have hoped, keeping his men warm in the coldest weather and holding up against 
the strongest winds.  Wanting to secure a patent for the design before selling his 
invention to the Army, Sibley remembered Lieutenant Burns in Philadelphia and 
requested his assistance. 10   
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By spring 1856, according to historian Jerry Thompson, “Lieutenant Burns had 
arranged for the models, drawings, and the technical details necessary for the awarding 
of the patent”:  Sibley got his patent on April 22, 1856.11  Burns also ordered the 
manufacture of twenty-five of the tents and had them shipped out west for sale at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas.  In return for his service, Sibley agreed for Burns to receive half 
of the royalties produced by sales of the tent, but according to Thompson, it was “a 
decision [Sibley] would later regret.”12  Burns, a stickler for details, requested for this 
arrangement to be put in writing, a request Sibley declined to fulfill, preferring a 
gentleman’s agreement in lieu of an official contract.  Unlike Sibley, denied royalties 
because he sided with the Confederacy, Burns would never have cause to regret this 
business deal, profiting from it greatly after the war. 13 
His stint in Philadelphia complete, Burns was transferred to Florida for the 
duration of the Third Seminole War (1856-1857).  He was appointed regimental 
Quartermaster of the 5th Infantry at Fort Myers in November 1856.14  This was the 
beginning of Burns’ long career in the Commissary Department, a period interrupted 
only by his brief experience as a combat officer during the Civil War.  Burns was made 
for commissary duty; his attention to detail and rigid sense of discipline were well-suited 
to the job, making for a steady rise up the ranks. 
Service in Florida was a miserable fate, time spent wading through swamps, 
swatting at mosquitoes, and trying to avoid dysentery and malaria.  Nevertheless, Burns 
found time to make friends.  Future Union general Oliver O. Howard remembered, 
“Burns, though he had never seen me before, extended to me his hospitality.”15  Burns, 
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Howard, and other similarly inclined officers often found relief from the oppressive 
conditions in religion; it is not clear if Burns was a deeply religious man before his 
Seminole duty, he certainly was after it. 
Moving from one climatic extreme to another, Burns found himself (along with 
the rest of the 5th Infantry) transferred to Fort Leavenworth in the summer of 1857.  
Inspired by a religious revival the year before, Mormon unrest had driven federal 
authorities out of the Utah Territory.  The year had already seen considerable public 
turmoil over the issue of slavery, and President James Buchanan was determined not to 
allow another source of unrest to fester.  A chance to divert attention from the divisive 
slavery issue and the potential threat to the California-Oregon Trail were also probable 
factors in his decision.  In May he ordered an expedition by the army to occupy Mormon 
centers in the Great Salt Lake Valley in Utah.  Burns and the 5th Infantry were part of a 
five-hundred man expedition that left Fort Leavenworth in mid-July. 16 
Having started too late in the year to avoid the beginning of winter in the 
mountains during their march to Utah, Burns and his comrades found themselves 
trudging through increasingly difficult weather as the days dragged on.  Confusion over 
who was to command the expedition had forced the troops to begin their march with 
Colonel Edmund B. Alexander as an interim commander.  Knowing that a new 
commander would eventually be coming to take responsibility for the campaign, 
Alexander chose to mill about the northern edge of the Utah Territory and accomplish 
nothing except to get his men caught in an October blizzard and expose his supply train 
to harassment by Mormon rangers.  One can only imagine how difficult the conditions 
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must have made Burns’ job as regimental quartermaster.  When Colonel Albert S. 
Johnston arrived in November to take command of the expedition he immediately put 
the men into winter quarters at Fort Bridger.17   
The onset of winter gave the Mormons the opportunity to make peace with 
President Buchanan.  Forced to wait first for good weather and then for the arrival of 
reinforcements and supplies from Fort Leavenworth, the expedition was unable to get 
moving until mid-June, just in time to hear news of a negotiated settlement between the 
Mormons and the Federal government.  With no rebellion left to quell, Johnston and his 
men had nothing to do but establish a new army post in the Utah Territory.  This 
accomplished, Johnston began issuing leave to some officers, but not Burns; the 
lieutenant was prompted by his disappointment to write a letter of complaint to 
Johnston’s adjutant, Major Fitz-John Porter.18   
Perhaps Burns was mollified by his appointment to Johnston’s staff as chief 
commissary of subsistence and his attendant promotion to captain on November 3, 1858.  
Mollified or not, Burns’ career was on the ascent.  His devotion to the army and his 
sense of discipline attracted enough attention that Burns, out of three regimental 
quartermasters involved in the Mormon Expedition, was chosen to be chief of 
commissary.  George B. McClellan described the position as “difficult and of the 
greatest importance . . . upon its proper performance the success of the army depends.”19  
This appointment was the first in a string of similar appointments with increasing 
responsibilities for Burns throughout his army career; he would eventually retire as a 
colonel in the commissary department. 
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With tensions reduced to a tolerable level in Utah, Burns found his services 
needed in Indian Territory (modern Oklahoma).  Burns supervised subsistence affairs in 
Indian Territory from 1859-60.  Stationed at Fort Smith, Arkansas, just over the border 
from Indian Territory, Burns found himself in a vulnerable position as tensions increased 
to the boiling point between North and South.  Inflamed by debates over the issues of the 
morality of human bondage and the power of the states in relation to that of the Federal 
government, slave-holding Southerners viewed the upcoming presidential election of 
1860 as a referendum on the desirability of remaining part of the Union.  With no one 
party effectively represented in both North and South, the election turned into an 
awkward four-sided contest, giving the electoral victory to Republican Abraham 
Lincoln.  Elected by a plurality based mostly in Northern, free states, Lincoln had run on 
an anti-slavery, pro-tariff platform that outraged pro-slavery, states’ rights Southerners, 
causing the region, in the words of one historian, to “[fall] into a hysterical state.”20  A 
wave of enthusiasm for the idea of seceding from the Union swept across the Deep 
South. 
Burns, a Democrat, was not happy with the results of the election.  The 
Democratic party split into two camps during the campaign of 1860, with Northern 
Democrats supporting the candidacy of Stephen A. Douglas and Southern Democrats 
that of John C. Breckinridge; the two candidates differed on the issue of Federal 
protection of slavery with Douglas opposing and Breckinridge in favor.  Burns was a 
rarity, a Northerner who “advocated the [position] of the south as presented in the 
platform of Breckinridge.”21  The Ohioan was predisposed to be sympathetic to the 
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Southern viewpoint, explaining that “my father [a native Virginian] always politically 
and personally stood by the interest of the south.”22  In addition, with the exception of 
his two-year stint in Philadelphia, Burns spent most of his pre-war army career in the 
South and Southwest.  He married into a Kentucky family and he had friends in Texas, 
Florida and Arkansas who undoubtedly influenced the political views of the already 
conservative officer.  Even after the war had begun, Burns had a difficult time working 
up any animosity towards the South and he regretted that a people he admired found it so 
easy to feel animosity towards him.  He lamented that he had “never been able to 
understand the feelings of enmity generated in the hearts of those from south of an 
imaginary line against those born north of said imaginary line,” and argued that slavery 
was merely a “pretense” hiding underlying cultural hostility between the two sections.23  
Burns’ sympathy for the grievances of the South offered him no protection from 
those determined to rebel in Arkansas.  Like the populations in the other states 
comprising the Upper South, the people of Arkansas initially hesitated at the idea of 
secession.  Many supported the already-seceded Deep South states, but chose to wait and 
see what approach the Federal government would take to the situation after Lincoln’s 
inauguration.  Having decided upon this approach, the Arkansas secession convention 
adjourned in March 1861 without voting either for or against disunion.  Given that there 
was still some moderate Unionist sentiment in the northern part of the state, the respite 
surely allowed some additional debate on the subject as winter turned into spring.  
However, all semblance of debate vanished after Lincoln’s call for troops in order to 
take military action against the South in the wake of the newly formed Confederate 
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government’s decision to open fire on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861.  Arkansas 
governor Henry Rector, riding a wave of pro-secession public sentiment, immediately 
ordered the seizure of Federal arsenals at the state capital of Little Rock and the capture 
of the garrison at Fort Smith by state militia.  The secession convention belatedly 
supported the governor’s precipitous action by voting 69-1 in favor of secession on May 
6.24 
For Burns and his comrades at Fort Smith, the winter and spring of 1861 must 
have been a time of nearly unbearable tension.  An early decision of the Lincoln 
administration was to remove the garrison from potential danger in Arkansas to the 
safety of Fort Leavenworth.  On February 13 General-in-Chief Winfield Scott wired 
orders to Brigadier General William S. Harney, commanding the Department of the 
West, demanding “the immediate abandonment” of Fort Smith.25  However, upon 
learning of the fort’s planned evacuation, the citizens of the surrounding counties wrote 
to Secretary of War Simon Cameron of their “deep regret” at the decision and, 
proclaiming their loyalty, asked that the movement be postponed at least until the state’s 
convention officially voted in favor of secession.26  Scott wired Harney on February 22 
with a terse, one-line instruction:  “Stop the march of the troops from Fort Smith.”27  
Trapped by this political decision, the troops at Fort Smith spent the next six weeks 
before the firing upon Fort Sumter living in fear of finding an angry mob of secession-
minded Arkansans gathering at the gates. 
Events in Arkansas rapidly spiraled out of control following the fall of Sumter.  
Governor Rector actively encouraged by the Confederate government in Montgomery, 
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Alabama, immediately went on the offensive, seizing whatever Federal supplies and 
equipment his militia could find, and assembling an expedition to head up the Arkansas 
River by steamer to capture Fort Smith.  Lieutenant Colonel William H. Emory, riding 
west from Fort Smith to take command of Federal troops stationed in Indian Territory, 
wrote to St. Louis on April 18 of his concern that a year’s worth of supplies being sent 
by steamer to his new command would be intercepted by rebel militia on the Arkansas 
River.28  Burns, having heard rumors that just such an act was planned, wrote on April 
19 that he would “start to-day down the river to meet [the supply steamers], hoping that I 
can get on the boat, and, by advising with the captain, avoid points and escape 
excitement.”29  Events, as Burns wired to Washington on April 21, did not go as he 
planned: 
On arriving at Little Rock I found military preparations made to intercept all  
boats loaded with U.S. stores.  The steamboat Sky Lark had just passed, after  
having been boarded and the U.S. stores taken from her at Pine Bluff.  I learned  
(from the paper and otherwise) that the Silver Lake, No. 2, would be seized if  
not taken at Pine Bluff (cannon were stationed for that purpose and cannoneers  
ready).  I called upon some prominent citizens, heretofore Union men, who  
advised me to see the governor.  I called, but did not find his excellency at home.   
I very soon discovered that the revolution was general.  Troops were enrolling to  
march on Fort Smith.  The steamboat I came down on was chartered.  When I  
arrived at Pine Bluff I found the Silver Lake, No. 2, tied up and strongly guarded.   
The crew had left, the stores were placed in different houses in town, and the  
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steamboat was to transport troops to Fort Smith.30 
 
Realizing that Arkansas had become far too dangerous a place for a Federal 
officer to be wandering about, Burns concluded with his intention to make his way up to 
St. Louis where he would help plan an overland supply expedition for the forts in Indian 
Territory.31  His position made untenable by the seizure of the supplies at Pine Bluff, 
Captain Samuel D. Sturgis, Fort Smith’s commander, withdrew his troops from that 
place late in the evening of April 23, leaving behind only a handful of staff officers and 
orderlies to arrange the transport of any equipment left behind and (rather optimistically) 
to await the arrival of any who answered Washington’s call for pro-Union Arkansas 
volunteers.  Only an hour or two after Sturgis’ departure, 235 Arkansas militia under the 
command of Colonel Solon Borland arrived via steamers and captured the fort and all 
within.  Burns, as chief commissary, would likely have been among those left behind 
and made prisoners of war had he not been away on his trip down the Arkansas River.32 
 With Indian Territory no longer under Federal control, Burns found himself 
without any active responsibilities.  He returned to his native Ohio while waiting for a 
new assignment.  In Cincinnati Burns had the most fateful run-in of his military career:  
he met with the newly appointed head of all Ohio troops, Major General of Volunteers 
George B. McClellan.  McClellan later recalled that “Capt. Burns . . . happened to pass 
through Cincinnati unemployed, so that I detained him, and at last kept him 
permanently.” 33  While Burns and McClellan would have been acquainted from their 
time together at West Point, it is not clear if the two men were friends or correspondents 
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prior to this meeting.  Burns was appointed Chief of Commissary on McClellan’s staff 
on May 2, 1861.34  The captain would have come highly recommended for the post.  His 
service in Florida, Utah, and Arkansas, carrying out heavy responsibilities under difficult 
conditions, proved his worth as a commissary officer and McClellan jumped at the 
chance to add Burns to his embryonic staff.  When McClellan was appointed head of the 
newly created Department of Ohio (an area encompassing Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois) on 
May 3, Burns’ responsibilities increased accordingly.  With McClellan’s promotion to 
major general in the Regular Army on May 14, Burns was firmly attached to a general 
whose star was in the ascent.  
 Facing Burns was the monumental task of organizing supplies for a new 
department and thousands of newly raised troops, with more arriving every day.  Burns 
had to catalog supplies on hand and those incoming from Washington, arrange supply 
lines for new camps, and make sure there was enough food and equipment for a plethora 
of new units.  He was probably hindered more than helped by McClellan’s conviction, 
according to historian Stephen W. Sears,  that “the Ohio Valley was the scene of a crisis 
of the highest priority,” an attitude which served simply to irritate authorities in 
Washington rather than inspire any sense of urgency that might have prodded them to 
ship more of the supplies Burns needed.35  Nevertheless, Burns did his job well enough 
that, less than a month after the formation of the new department on May 26, McClellan 
was able to launch a campaign with 15,000 troops to secure western Virginia for the 
Union. 
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 George McClellan’s campaign in western Virginia in the summer of 1861 was 
one of the early successes of the Union war effort.  He quickly secured the vital 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad running through the northern part of the region and by July 
13 had thoroughly outmaneuvered and scattered a badly outnumbered Confederate army 
under Brigadier General Robert S. Garnett, who died in the fighting.  A pro-Union 
provisional state government was established in the town of Wheeling and the seeds 
were sown for the creation of West Virginia as a separate state.  It was easily the most 
impressive campaign conducted by either side in 1861. 
 Burns’ responsibilities as chief of commissary extended to include the western 
Virginia campaign.  He was no stranger to field operations, having served as regimental 
quartermaster during the Third Seminole War and as chief of commissary for the Utah 
Expedition in 1857-58.  This campaign, however, was a quantum leap beyond anything 
ever required of him before.  Burns was responsible for supplying the entirety of 
McClellan’s force while on the move, a task made even more difficult when McClellan 
split off a detachment under Brigadier General Jacob Cox to conduct operations in the 
Great Kanawha Valley.  His superior was not an easy man for whom to work.  
McClellan was often critical of his subordinates and, as Sears notes, “was convinced that 
very little was done or done right unless he personally supervised it.”36  Burns, who had 
quickly become an ardent admirer of McClellan, thrived under the difficult conditions, 
never losing the confidence of his general. 
 McClellan was an easy man to admire.  He was a dynamic, energetic, charismatic 
general who inspired confidence in those around him.  His fellow officers were his 
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strongest supporters and most would give him their unwavering loyalty, as did Burns.  
His closest circle of friends and admirers among his subordinates were convinced that 
McClellan was “the only man who [could] save this country from permanent disruption 
and [the Union] army from disaster.”37  It was probably not coincidence that many of 
these same officers shared McClellan’s political views.  A conservative Democrat, like 
Burns, McClellan’s “sympathy with Southern attitudes would remain constant-- with the 
singular exception of the matter of secession”, according to Sears.38   
 Holding such political views would cause trouble for McClellan, and, by 
association, his admirers.  McClellan believed in waging war against enemy troops, not 
against civilians.  Upon entering western Virginia, he issued a proclamation in which he 
promised that his army would not interfere with slavery and would “crush” any slave 
rebellion “with an iron hand.”39  McClellan’s attitude toward the South was not well-
received by Radical Republicans in Congress, most of whom favored wielding that “iron 
hand” against the rebels, be they civilian or military, not against the slaves.  For his part, 
McClellan bore ill will towards extremists on both sides of the conflict, arguing, 
according to Sears, that “mutual fanaticism” had pushed the country to the brink of 
disaster.40    
 Any euphoria over McClellan’s successful campaign was short-lived.  A Union 
army under Brigadier General Irvin McDowell advanced from Washington into northern 
Virginia during the third week of July.  On July 21 McDowell attacked a Confederate 
army at Manassas Junction under Generals Joseph Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard and 
before nightfall had been repulsed in a humiliating rout.  It was obvious, for national 
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morale if for no other reason, that McDowell had to be replaced.  The most logical and 
compelling candidate was the conqueror of western Virginia.  On July 22 McClellan was 
recalled to Washington to take command of what would become the Army of the 
Potomac. 
 As McClellan rose so did Burns, who was promoted to the rank of major on 
August 3.41  Despite this, Burns remained in western Virginia to carry on his duties as 
chief of commissary for McClellan’s successor, Brigadier General William S. 
Rosecrans.  However, Burns now aimed his ambitions higher than serving in the same 
post under a different general:  he wanted to fight.  Burns may never have recorded his 
reasons for wanting a combat command.  His obituary states that “staff duty was never 
exactly congenial to his taste or ambition.”42  Perhaps he yearned for the opportunities 
for advancement created by a field command, or perhaps he was shamed by keeping a 
relatively safe staff position when friends and comrades, such as Oliver Howard and 
Fitz-John Porter, were putting themselves in danger with the troops, or perhaps he 
simply wanted the greater glory available on the front lines.  McClellan, who was 
already complaining that he had “good material, but no officers,” granted Burns his 
wish:  the thirty-six year old Ohioan was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers on 
September 28.43  The promotion actually reduced Burns’ responsibilities for a time.  His 
new rank warranted a brigade command but there were no such positions open at that 
moment.  Given the mostly quiet nature of the Eastern theater that fall, Burns surely 
could not have anticipated the quick and violent nature in which a brigade slot would 
become open. 
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 As summer turned into fall, Union and Confederate armies spent the days facing 
each other in defensive positions on opposite sides of the Potomac River.  In mid-
October, McClellan received intelligence reports that the Confederates were reducing the 
size of the garrison at Leesburg, Virginia, geographically the most important point in the 
Confederate line along the upper Potomac.  Still in the midst of organizing and training 
the Army of the Potomac to his specifications, McClellan had no interest in fighting a 
battle for Leesburg.  However, he was receiving criticism from Radical Republicans in 
Congress who wanted to see the Army of the Potomac take some action rather than lick 
its wounds in plain view of the enemy.  Taking an opportunity for gaining a victory 
through maneuver rather than fighting, McClellan ordered a division under Brigadier 
General George McCall, positioned just on the Virginia side of the river in front of 
Washington, to advance north toward Leesburg while another division under Brigadier 
General Charles Stone threatened the town from across the river to the east.  On October 
20, McClellan ordered Stone to monitor Leesburg for any withdrawal on the part of the 
Confederate garrison prompted by McCall to the south, and suggested that “a slight 
demonstration on your part [might] have the effect to move them.”44  McClellan never 
intended for Stone to cross the river, but Stone chose to exercise the discretion allowed 
by McClellan’s vague order and conduct a small raid on the Confederate defenses on the 
other side of the Potomac.  To make matters worse, McCall was ordered back to camp 
on October 21 after no movement on the part of the Confederate garrison was 
observed.45 
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 Stone’s first move was to cross the river with a detachment of 300 men from the 
15th Massachusetts Regiment for a reconnaissance mission at a place called Ball’s Bluff 
on the night of October 20.  The young captain in charge of the mission mistook 
haystacks for tents in the moonlight and reported that there was only a small, inattentive 
Confederate force near Leesburg, leading Stone to believe that a prompt crossing could 
be made safely the following day.46   
On the morning of October 21, Stone assigned command of the movement on 
Leesburg to Colonel Edward Baker, commander of the Philadelphia (or California) 
Brigade, allowing him the discretion to either proceed with the raid or to withdraw back 
across the river.  Baker was a prominent Republican and an Oregon senator, as well as a 
close friend of Abraham Lincoln, turned officer whose military experience in the Black 
Hawk and Mexican Wars evidently taught him little in the way of forethought.  He 
almost immediately decided to bring the remainder of the 15th Massachusetts across the 
Potomac as well as all four regiments of his brigade.  Crossing an additional 1,400 men 
in small boats took all morning, during which time the Massachusetts troops came under 
fire from the lead elements of Colonel Nathan “Shanks” Evans’ brigade of Mississippi 
and Virginia troops, victorious veterans of First Manassas.  Evans had been made aware 
of Stone’s plans through dispatches removed from a captured Union courier the day 
before and quickly marched his battle-hardened men to contain the small bridgehead 
without being distracted by a downriver feint Stone intended to prevent just such a 
concentration. 47   
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The Union troops had been taking casualties from heavy Confederate fire for 
some time before Baker himself crossed the river around 2:00 p.m.  Arriving in time to 
witness the repulse of a probing attack from a Mississippi regiment, Baker went out front 
to steady his men and organize a counterattack.  Standing out in front of the Union line, 
Baker was rushed by a group of Confederates, one of whom emptied a revolver at the 
Union commander.  Baker died instantly from the nearly simultaneous impact of four to 
six bullets.48 
 Demoralized by Baker’s death, mounting casualties, and their precarious position 
at the edge of the bluff overlooking the river, the Union troops wavered.  Baker’s 
subordinates decided a withdrawal was necessary, but all organization was lost as the 
troops tried to move to the water’s edge under the heavy fire.  The Union men panicked 
and soon were sliding down the bluff and jumping into the river.  The Confederates 
advanced and fired into the disorganized mass, and large groups of Union soldiers began 
to surrender.  By the end, less than 800 men of the 1,700 that crossed under Baker made 
it to safety.  Bodies of drowned Union soldiers washed up on the riverbank in 
Washington for days afterwards.  It was this shattered brigade that Burns was placed in 
command of on October 30.49 
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CHAPTER III 
AN ABLE GENERAL 
 
 Edward Baker’s old “California” brigade was a shambles, left for someone else 
to pick up its pieces and rejuvenate it.  Whatever Baker’s failures as a tactician, the 
warrior-senator had been a tremendously popular commander.  Skills learned from a 
long and successful political career translated well for Baker as a camp commander, 
gaining him the affection and respect of his men.  Furthermore, Baker proved lax in the 
administration of discipline, a trait bound to endear him to soldiers not used to the hard 
life of the army.  His death and the subsequent mauling suffered by the brigade left the 
men mournful and demoralized.  Thus Burns’ immediate concerns as the incoming 
commander were dealing with the psychological aftermath of the defeat at Ball’s Bluff 
and applying firm discipline to a unit unfamiliar with such measures.1 
 Burns understood the situation well and took his responsibility seriously.  He 
later explained to a group of veterans from his brigade that, “I had to be cruel, only to be 
kind . . . your health, your life, and your honor were in my keeping, all shaken at Ball’s 
Bluff, and to be tried in future fields.”2  And cruel he was, establishing “a strict and 
impartial code of discipline that applied to officers and men alike.”3  No longer was the 
comfort of the men the primary consideration of their commander, instead only their 
efficiency as soldiers.  Where Baker had strolled amiably through the camps, stopping to 
chat with his men to keep their spirits high, Burns stalked through, watching keenly for 
any sign of lax discipline.  He once spotted a private walking a lackadaisical patrol along 
a camp perimeter:  the general approached him quietly from behind, grabbed the rifle off 
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the shoulder of the unsuspecting guard, and lectured him on the importance of taking his 
duty more seriously before sending the humiliated private off to spend three days in the 
guard house.  The soldiers quickly learned to be on alert for their new brigade 
commander at all times.  Given Burns’ predilection towards high standards of discipline 
and the sorry state of the brigade before his arrival, the Ohioan was surely among the 
best possible choices to replace the fallen Baker.4 
 There would be no more fighting for the Philadelphia Brigade until spring came 
to the Potomac.  Baker had bivouacked the brigade on an exposed hilltop, in range of 
Confederate guns across the river and with no protection from the elements.  With winter 
looming, Burns relocated his troops to a more wooded area offering a degree of shelter 
from the storms to come.  It must have pleased him when the brigade was issued Sibley 
tents in December.  Beneficially, from Burns’ point of view, the winter proved mild 
enough to allow drilling to remain part of the daily routine.  Officers carrying copies of 
Hardee’s Tactics could be found putting the brigade’s various regiments through their 
paces for the duration of the winter.5 
 Burns and the Philadelphia Brigade were going through a process that mirrored 
in many ways that of George McClellan and the Army of the Potomac during the winter 
of 1861-62.  While Irvin McDowell had been nowhere near as popular to the army as 
Edward Baker had been to his brigade, both Burns and McClellan inherited units that 
had recently suffered humiliation at the hands of the enemy.  Both bodies of troops were 
unused to the strict discipline necessary for success in a hard-fought battle and would 
require extensive drilling before they stood ready for a return engagement against a 
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confident foe inspired by recent victories.  Officers such as Burns played a vital part of 
this transformation.  Competent commanders with an eye for discipline were required in 
numbers in order to train the great mass of volunteers that made up the Army of the 
Potomac.  Burns possessed the necessary qualities and took to his task with enthusiasm, 
inspiring the regimental commanders in his brigade to the point that “they displayed a 
worthy spirit of emulation in their endeavors to improve the excellence of their 
comrades.”6  Therefore Burns and dozens like him carried out McClellan’s plan to train 
and transform the Army of the Potomac.  The Philadelphia Brigade’s official historian 
remarked that their camp along the Potomac that winter could have been named “Camp 
Preparation.”7 
 Events further up the Potomac forced Burns’ brigade out of its winter camp 
earlier than he would have liked.  With an offensive beginning on New Year’s Day, 
1862, Confederate Major General “Stonewall” Jackson maneuvered a Federal garrison 
out of the small town of Romney in the northwest corner of the Shenandoah Valley.  
This move relieved pressure on the western flank of Jackson’s main base of operations 
across the Valley at Winchester.  Of more concern to Washington, the Federal retreat 
also exposed the Virginia section of the strategically important Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad to Jackson’s army.  “Stonewall” wasted little time taking advantage of the 
opportunity, destroying nearly 100 miles of track by the end of January.8   
 Growing concerned, McClellan took steps to counter Jackson’s move.  Brigadier 
General John Sedgwick, commander of the 2nd Division, the Philadelphia Brigade’s new 
parent unit, was ordered on February 21 to take two brigades to the assistance of Major 
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General Nathaniel P. Banks at Harpers Ferry.9  Burns and his brigade left their winter 
camp four days later for what proved to be a month-long deployment to Harpers Ferry.  
Despite a brief march to the outskirts of Winchester, there was to be no test of combat 
for the new brigade commander on this occasion;  with Banks’ far superior numbers to 
his front and with his right flank uncovered by Joe Johnston’s sudden withdrawal from 
his line along the Potomac, Jackson was compelled to relinquish his gains and retreat to 
safety farther up the Shenandoah Valley.  Instead, the brigade was subjected to freezing 
temperatures and marched through pouring rains for what seemed to be little purpose.  
Even worse, Burns found that adequate supplies could not be secured for his men after 
their arrival at Harpers Ferry.  Morale among Burns’ tired, cold, and hungry men sank as 
they were transferred from western Virginia to Washington, D.C., near the end of 
March.10   
 Appalled, Burns later recorded that this “ill-judged campaign . . . in snow, rain, 
and mud, without shelter or supplies . . . [wasted] most of the good of the two month’s 
discipline, blighting the self-reliance and ambition which go to make the true soldier.”11  
Historian Bradley Gottfried argues, with the benefit of hindsight, that the campaign was 
a waste of time, since “Jackson would have abandoned Winchester whether there had 
been a buildup of Union troops or not.”12  This may be true, but it could not have been 
known at the time, given that Johnston’s withdrawal from the Potomac was not 
predicted.   Burns, despite his initial frustration, would find in the coming months that 
the short campaign had not harmed his brigade in any appreciable manner. 
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 Sedgwick’s division, including Burns’ brigade, was recalled to Washington in 
order to join the rest of the Army of the Potomac for what General McClellan envisioned 
as a bold campaign against the Confederate capital of Richmond and its defending army.  
McClellan’s tenure at the head of the Army of the Potomac thus far was notable mainly 
for his apparent inactivity and a great deal of secrecy regarding his plans for the future.  
McClellan spent his winter defending the need to take several months to organize and 
train his volunteer army and resting in bed after contracting typhoid fever in late 
December.13 
 Finally, after insistent prodding by Lincoln, in early February McClellan 
unveiled an ambitious plan to outflank the Confederate army at Manassas Junction by 
loading his troops onto transports and steaming down the Chesapeake Bay to land at 
Urbanna, between Johnston’s army and Richmond.  Lincoln approved the plan and steps 
were put in motion to accomplish the task.  Then, on March 8, Johnston withdrew his 
army from Manassas to a position closer to Richmond, unwittingly rendering the 
Urbanna plan obsolete by placing his troops closer to the Confederate capital than 
McClellan’s proposed landing site.14 
 Adapting quickly to the changed circumstances, McClellan altered his plan from 
landing at Urbanna to landing at Fort Monroe, a Federal-held bastion on the southern tip 
of the Virginia Peninsula, seventy-five miles southeast of Richmond.  While not his 
preferred option, landing at Fort Monroe offered McClellan the same benefits as did 
Urbanna:  a chance to threaten Richmond before the Confederates could react 
effectively, forcing Johnston’s army to fight in unfavorable conditions.  Sedgwick’s 
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division, due to its assignment to the Shenandoah Valley, was one of the last divisions to 
embark for the Peninsula.  Burns’ brigade marched to Alexandria, Virginia, in late 
March to board steamers bound for Fort Monroe; the 3,624 men under his command all 
arrived at the crowded fortress by March 31.15 
 McClellan arrived at Fort Monroe on April 2 and immediately began the process 
of setting his army in motion.  On April 4 the first of over 66,000 men set off down the 
Peninsula’s two main roads in the direction of Yorktown.  Sedgwick’s division was 
among the lead units marching down the Yorktown Road.  Burns’ men met little 
opposition on what proved to be an easy march to Big Bethel, the winter camp of the 
Confederate forces at Yorktown during the prior months.  They stopped there for the 
night, expecting to complete their march to Yorktown during the following morning.  In 
the morning Burns’ brigade, and the rest of the Army of the Potomac, encountered the 
first of many challenges during this campaign:  mud.  A morning rainstorm turned the 
Yorktown Road into a morass of knee-deep mud, slowing the brigade’s progress to a 
crawl.  After leaving camp at 5:00 a.m., Burns’ men could slog through only five miles 
of mud in four hours before stopping to rest and wait out the rain.  They resumed their 
march early in the afternoon and reached the vicinity of the Confederate fortifications at 
Yorktown before stopping for the day.16 
 On April 6, McClellan selected Burns’ brigade to conduct the first unit-level 
reconnaissance of the Confederate position, focusing on that part of the line between the 
two main roads.  In particular, McClellan wanted to know the locations of any masked 
enemy artillery batteries.  Burns’ men were expected to march across the Confederate 
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front, luring any such batteries into revealing their position by opening fire.  Excited at 
his first opportunity for some real action, Burns selected two regiments, the 72nd and 
106th Pennsylvania Volunteers, to personally lead on the mission.17 
 Burns put his men into formation shortly after dawn, throwing out skirmishers to 
his front and flanks.  Approaching the Confederate line, Burns’ two regiments entered a 
densely wooded area, forcing Burns to lead them in the right direction with only the aid 
of a pocket compass.  As the woods cleared, the Pennsylvanians suddenly hit the 
Confederate picket line, driving the enemy skirmishers back towards the main line.  
Burns’ men came under artillery fire from the fortifications shortly thereafter.  The 
position of the offending artillery battery was quickly noted and Burns withdrew his men 
to safety, only to repeat the process further down the line.  In this manner Burns and his 
two regiments made their way down the six miles of Confederate fortifications between 
the Yorktown Road and the Lee’s Mill Road.  Upon reaching Lee’s Mill, Burns pulled 
back from the enemy line, having successfully located the positions of several batteries 
without incurring the loss of a single man.18 
 McClellan was unprepared to find a Confederate defensive line stretching across 
the width of the Peninsula and was dismayed by the apparent strength of the enemy 
position.  Frustrated, he reacted in the manner dictated by his personality and his 
training; he abandoned the idea of a bold thrust at Richmond and settled in for a safe, 
cautious siege against Yorktown.  Confederate Major General John Magruder, 
commanding the forces defending Yorktown, enthusiastically aided and abetted this 
reaction by repeatedly marching his soldiers back and forth across the length of his line, 
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convincing McClellan that the rebel general had far more than a mere 15,000 men 
defending the position.19 
 Burns’ brigade, along with the rest of the Army of the Potomac, settled in for 
what proved to be a month-long siege while McClellan arranged to bring up the artillery 
and equipment he believed necessary to reduce Magruder’s fortifications.  The 
Pennsylvanians endured frequent heavy rains, shivered on cold, wet nights, and slogged 
through incredible amounts of mud to build roads for an army that was not moving.  
Burns marched his brigade out of camp every three days to spend twenty-four tense 
hours on picket duty in front of the enemy line, where the fear of Confederate snipers 
forced his men to suffer the miserable conditions without even the benefit of campfires.  
Morale sagged among the Yankee troops as April dragged on.20 
 Some comic relief during the siege of Yorktown was provided by the mid-air 
misadventures of Fitz John Porter.  On April 11 the Union general ascended alone in one 
of the hot-air balloons brought along by McClellan for aerial reconnaissance of the 
Confederate lines.  Strong winds broke the line tethering Porter’s balloon to the ground 
and, undoubtedly to Porter’s great discomfort, pushed the balloon beyond Union lines 
and over enemy territory.  To Porter’s relief, and that of the Union soldiers watching the 
unfolding fiasco, the wind soon shifted and the balloon drifted back over the line.  As 
soon as he hit the line the desperate Porter put the balloon into a hard descent and crash-
landed in the Philadelphia Brigade’s camp.  Burns invited the rattled Porter into his 
headquarters tent for a drink to calm his jangled nerves after his unanticipated brush with 
capture.21 
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 Showing his concern for the ebbing morale of his volunteers, Burns tried to raise 
the spirits of his men with a proclamation issued the next day, April 12.  In General 
Order No. 13 Burns relayed to the brigade his “proud satisfaction of seeing day by day, 
constant improvement in all the essential elements of soldierly patience, endurance, 
energy, and skill, and discipline which goes to make the veteran soldier.”  He told the 
men of his “full confidence . . . that you will acquit yourselves honorably,” reassuring 
them that “hundreds are killed in retreat, while but few fall advancing-- ‘fortune favors 
the brave’.”  Burns concluded his address with a melodramatic, Nelsonian flourish:  
“The eyes of your general, your relations, your country will be upon you.”  Burns meant 
well, but it is unlikely that General Orders No. 13 had much impact on any but the most 
impressionable young men.  His soldiers doubtless would have preferred an 
announcement of an upcoming end to the tedium of siege warfare to a declaration of 
confidence in their ability to fight. 22 
 April dragged on as McClellan assembled a collection of siege artillery in order 
to pulverize the Confederate positions prior to an assault on the shattered enemy line by 
the Army of the Potomac.  The Union general grew more confident as the bulk of the 
equipment began to arrive near the end of the month, inspiring him to finally set a date 
of May 5 for the beginning of the bombardment, with the infantry to follow within the 
next day or two.  Burns and his brigade would be among the many to storm the enemy 
fortifications.  The moment of truth seemed to have arrived.23 
 Joseph Johnston, who had taken command of the Confederate forces at 
Yorktown earlier in April after arriving with badly needed reinforcements, was not 
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oblivious to the Federal preparations.  Recognizing the near-certitude of crushing defeat 
at the hands of McClellan’s methodical plan, Johnston elected to withdraw his army 
farther up the peninsula to a position closer to Richmond.  With the aid of a few hastily 
devised ruses, and under the cover of an artillery barrage designed to keep suspicious 
Yankee heads down, Johnston slipped away on the night of May 3, taking his entire 
army with him.24 
 Caught entirely flat-footed, it took twelve hours for the Union army to organize 
any kind of pursuit of the retreating Confederates.  Northern soldiers gradually made 
their way into the abandoned enemy camps during the day, soon discovering a multitude 
of primitive land mines, then called torpedoes, left behind by vengeful Southerners.  
This threat caused the ever-cautious McClellan to prohibit Burns’ men, among others, 
from entering the empty camps across the line.  Instead, they were to hold their position 
until the next day when they, along with the rest of Sedgwick’s division, would march to 
Yorktown.  Burns’ eager soldiers spent May 4 sitting on their knapsacks watching 
“regiment after regiment march off to Yorktown.”25   
 May 5 greeted the Philadelphia Brigade with heavy rain and knee-deep mud, 
turning a short march into a miserable slog.  It was an inauspicious beginning to what 
would prove to be a month-long pursuit of Johnston’s army up the Peninsula to the 
outskirts of Richmond.  It got worse the next day when Burns lost a man, Private John 
Green of the 69th Pennsylvania Volunteer Regiment, to a torpedo in one of the 
abandoned camps near Yorktown.  The remainder of May saw Burns and his men endure 
a short time reembarked on the transports to take part in a flanking maneuver that failed 
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to materialize and repeated marches through heavy rain until they approached within 
twenty miles of Richmond as the month drew to a close.26 
 Burns dealt with the conditions perhaps less well than many of his men.  
Rheumatism afflicted the back of his neck and his shoulders, an ailment that could only 
have been exacerbated by the frequent rain.  He wore a silk handkerchief around his 
neck at all times for protection from the elements yet pain dogged him with each shift of 
the weather.  Nonetheless, Burns persevered despite his discomfort, taking care never to 
let his men see him in low spirits.  A few aches and pains were a small price to pay for 
the opportunity to finally lead men into battle.27 
 Having traded as much space for time as he could without marching into the 
streets of Richmond, Joe Johnston finally decided the time had come to take the 
offensive.  It had not gone unnoticed in the Confederate headquarters that McClellan had 
incautiously divided his army on either side of the Chickahominy River.  Making the 
situation more dangerous for the Federals, the heavy rains swelled the river to the point 
that bridges were washed out and normal fords were impassable.  Johnston devised a 
straightforward plan involving bringing fully three-quarters of his army against the 
Union left wing, striking it from three directions and intending to crush it while 
McClellan and the rest of his army looked on helplessly from across the rushing waters 
of the Chickahominy.28 
 Burns’ brigade, along with the rest of Edwin Sumner’s Second Corps, spent the 
night of May 30 in position to the north of the Chickahominy, taking shelter from a 
tremendous thunderstorm that drenched the area that evening.  Morning brought the 
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Philadelphia Brigade a rare moment of sunshine, in addition to the welcome sight of the 
paymaster.  Heavy flooding in the lowlands around them precluded all but the most 
urgent movement, and the Pennsylvanians spent the morning collecting their pay and 
generally drying out.  The quiet day lasted until 1:00 p.m., when the rumble of heavy 
gunfire drifted across the flooded river, marking the opening of Johnston’s surprise 
attack.29 
 Burns reacted calmly, ordering his men to draw rations and prepare to be on the 
march at a moment’s notice.  McClellan moved slowly, issuing orders to Sumner’s corps 
only to be ready to move upon further word.  Sumner, an aggressive veteran, chose a 
liberal interpretation of this order, starting Sedgwick’s division on the three-quarter mile 
march down to the nearest bridge where it would wait for the order to cross.  Burns’ 
brigade left the camp at 2:00 p.m., making the difficult hike through deep mud and 
standing water in admirable time;  it stood waiting at the Grapevine Bridge when 
McClellan’s order to cross came at 2:30.  Rushing water lapped at the underside of the 
frail-looking bridge, making it twist and turn, causing an engineer to pronounce the 
crossing unsafe.  Sumner, however, would not be stopped by mere water, and Burns’ 
men lined up to cross the narrow structure.30 
 Crossing in front of the Philadelphia Brigade were the six Napoleon guns of 
Lieutenant Edmund Kirby’s Battery I, 1st United States Artillery.  One of the cannon 
snapped through the flooring of the rickety bridge, becoming stuck beyond the ability of 
the gun’s crew to move it.  Burns, judging the value of having the artillery available as 
he went into battle worth a short delay, ordered his men to stop and disassemble the 
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Napoleon, then carry the separate pieces across the bridge.  Sumner was already on the 
south side of the river, urging his men forward towards the battle.  Any delay in reaching 
this goal exasperated the old corps commander and he called out to Burns to leave the 
artillery to its own devices and get his men across.  Showing flashes of a stubborn streak 
that would cripple his career within a year, Burns ignored Sumner and held his brigade 
back until the guns were safely across.  Twice more the fuming corps commander 
demanded that Burns keep moving, each time Burns insisted on waiting.  Before Sumner 
could repeat his command a fourth time, the guns were across and the Philadelphia 
Brigade rushed to the south bank.  Kirby’s battery, due to the help of Burns’ men, was 
the only one of the five attached to Sumner’s corps that made it across the 
Chickahominy in time to participate in the fighting that day.31 
 Once his four regiments were across, Burns ordered his men to the double-quick 
for the three-mile march to the battlefield.  Wounded men struggling through the mud to 
reach shelter across the river greeted the Pennsylvanians within the first mile, and the 
sound of gunfire echoed louder through the thick woods as Burns and his men 
approached the fighting.  Even at the double-quick, the thick mud slowed the march to a 
crawl, and it was 5:30 p.m. when the Philadelphia Brigade emerged from the woods onto 
the battlefield at Fair Oaks Station.32 
 Burns arrived in time to witness the final unraveling of Joe Johnston’s plan.  
While the initial attack of Confederate Major General Daniel H. Hill’s division earlier 
that afternoon had driven back the two Union divisions of Brigadier Generals Darius 
Couch and Silas Casey, the expected coordinated supporting attacks by other 
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Confederate units had not occurred.  Now, Brigadier General Chase Whiting’s 
Confederate division was conducting its own isolated assault against the Union troops 
defending a line at Fair Oaks Station, several hours after Hill’s attack.  This was the 
position that Sedgwick’s men arrived to reinforce.  They arrived just in time, as 
Sedgwick pushed his first brigade and Kirby’s battery forward to help stop Whiting’s 
first attack on the Union position.33 
 At Sedgwick’s orders, Burns started to form his brigade into battalions in mass, 
creating a second line in support of the first, already engaged line.  As the brigade 
watched the repulse of Whiting’s attack, Colonel D. C. Baxter of the 72nd Pennsylvania 
Volunteers cried out “That’s the music boys;  now for three cheers!”34  Caught up in the 
moment, Burns turned to his men, waving his hat in the air and adding “Let them be 
hearty!”35  Before the brigade finished sorting out its formation Sedgwick developed 
concerns about the exposed right flank of the first line and ordered Burns to take two 
regiments to extend that end of the line, leaving his other two regiments in reserve under 
Sedgwick’s command.  Burns selected the 69th and 72nd and led them to the desired 
location.  Connecting the left end of his line to the right of the original line proved 
challenging;  the combination of a wooded area immediately behind the lines and the 
fact that the regiment at the end of the first line changed face at least once during the 
battle foiled the first two attempts to join the lines, forcing Burns to personally lead his 
troops into the right position.  By the time this was accomplished night approached and 
the left and center of the Union line had repulsed the last Confederate attack of the day.36 
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 While Burns played only a small role in the fighting on the front line at Fair 
Oaks, his actions during the day had a significant impact on the outcome of the battle.  
With Whiting having left his artillery behind as he brought his troops up to attack Fair 
Oaks, Lieutenant Kirby’s battery, along with the remnants of another battery already on 
the field, was the only formation of artillery on either side to take part in the fighting.  
One of his guns got stuck in the mud south of the Chickahominy, but the other five met 
each Confederate attack with a punishing fire.  Sedgwick reported that Kirby’s “terrific 
fire . . . contributed in a very high degree to break and finally scatter [Confederate] 
forces."37  Kirby recorded that, even after losing a gun early in the action to a broken 
trail, his battery fired 343 rounds that afternoon, including 48 rounds of canister for 
close-range combat.  Perhaps most significantly, it was a shell from Kirby’s battery that 
unhorsed Joe Johnston, observing the battle from several hundred yards away, leaving 
him severely wounded and clearing the way for Robert E. Lee to take command of the 
Confederate army.38 
 Burns’ efforts to improve the training and discipline of his brigade showed in the 
actions of his men in their first significant fight after Ball’s Bluff.  Sedgwick wrote that 
the two regiments left under his command during the battle “were several times moved 
from their positions to different portions of the field at double-quick, evincing their 
eagerness to become engaged.”39  He also commented that the brigade “gave 
unmistakable evidence of being ready if ordered forward to rush to the support of their 
comrades with alacrity and unshrinking firmness.”40  Despite not being heavily engaged, 
the brigade lost five killed and thirty wounded during the afternoon, almost entirely from 
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the two regiments left behind with Sedgwick.  Burns’ pride shines through in his after-
action report:  “I am entirely satisfied with the conduct of my brigade.  It has been 
christened under fire, and will do what is required of it.”41 
 Around midnight Sumner ordered Burns to take his California Regiment and 
three other reserve regiments from other brigades and fall back to the bridgehead over 
the Chickahominy to cover their line of communication and protect the artillery still 
stuck in the mud.   In the early hours of the morning Burns learned of a road around 
the Union right flank that was unguarded by any Northern soldiers.  Concerned about a 
possible enemy flanking maneuver, Burns roused the California Regiment from their 
sleep and posted them at a farm on that road.  McClellan, riding by the next day, praised 
Burns for his initiative and declared the farm “the key to the position.”42  Burns was with 
the regiment when fighting resumed at Fair Oaks that morning.  By the time he reached 
the scene of the previous day’s fighting the Confederate attacks had been beaten back 
and the battle was over.43 
 Both armies spent the next three weeks licking their wounds and preparing for 
the next fight.  Lee, having taken over for the wounded Johnston, needed time to 
reorganize the command structure of the newly christened Army of Northern Virginia 
into what he hoped would be a more efficient system.  In the meantime, he awaited the 
arrival of “Stonewall” Jackson and his troops from the Shenandoah Valley.  McClellan, 
concerned by the near debacle at Fair Oaks, needed time to build up infrastructure in his 
rear areas, putting better bridges across the Chickahominy and laying new roads through 
the forest.  Like Lee, he too awaited reinforcements, with his coming from Washington. 
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 Despite the lack of movement in the lines, these weeks were not a time of 
inactivity for Burns and his men.  Camped at times within 100 yards of the picket lines, 
Burns maintained a constant vigilance, keeping his men on alert for Rebel forays into his 
position.  The Confederates did not disappoint and small skirmishes were frequent.  
Even during times of relative quiet, random sniping from the enemy pickets kept life 
dangerous.  An unofficial truce among the opposing pickets had been arranged on the 
106th’s part of the line.  Burns, apparently finding this development a bit too unmilitary 
for his tastes, ended the truce by sending sharpshooters out to “annoy the enemy.”44  
Suitably annoyed, the Confederates responded the next day by wheeling up some 
artillery and spraying a few rounds of canister into the Federal pickets, causing several 
casualties and ending “that sort of experiment while on this line.”45 
 This uneasy period of intense skirmishing gave way to a week of frantic activity 
and heavy fighting beginning on June 25, the first of what would come to be known as 
the Seven Days.  With Jackson’s arrival imminent, Lee developed a plan to take the 
offensive, pushing the Army of the Potomac away from Richmond, if not destroying it 
outright.  McClellan made his last offensive move of the campaign on the 25th, pushing a 
half-hearted foray against part of the Confederate lines in front of the city with 
inconclusive results.  The next day saw Lee’s first move, an attack against Fitz John 
Porter’s Fifth Corps at Mechanicsville, an attempted flanking maneuver that fell victim 
to a lack of coordination similar to that which plagued Johnston at Fair Oaks.  Despite 
the tactical failure of Lee’s initial attack, McClellan proved easily intimidated.  Already 
believing himself outnumbered, the specter of being outflanked as well prompted the 
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Union commander to postpone his goal of taking Richmond and to plot a withdrawal to 
the safety of the James River, where the heavy artillery of his gunboats could protect 
him while he planned his next move.  McClellan’s conviction that he must save his army 
from destruction was strengthened when Lee broke through Porter’s lines at Gaines’ 
Mill on the 27th.  The ensuing battles of the next four days would be products of Lee’s 
attempts to catch McClellan at vulnerable points during his retreat, hoping to destroy 
large segments of his army at once.46   
 By virtue of its position on the line covering the road network, Sedgwick’s 
division, and thus Burns’ brigade, was part of the force assigned to shield the retreat 
against probing Confederates.  June 28 was a day of uncertainty; Burns’ brigade was 
ordered to strike camp and prepare to move without knowing if they would be retreating 
or advancing.  To the disappointment of the men, and doubtless of Burns as well, orders 
finally came down in the pre-dawn hours of the 29th to withdraw to the southeast, 
covering a junction of the Nine Mile Road and the Richmond & York River Railroad 
named Savage Station.47 
 Savage Station had been a railhead for the right wing of McClellan’s army and 
Federal troops were frantically moving from that place what supplies they could and 
burning those they could not.  More significantly, from Savage Station the Union rear 
guard could cover two important roads:  the Nine Mile Road, leading back to Grapevine 
Bridge, Jackson’s anticipated crossing point of the Chickahominy, and the Williamsburg 
Road, along which two Confederate divisions under General Magruder were advancing.  
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Failure to defend this point would leave the retreating Union column vulnerable to being 
rolled up from behind. 
 Burns arrived at a place called Orchard Station, two miles northwest of Savage 
Station, and placed his brigade in line with other brigades from Sumner’s corps.  Shortly 
thereafter, Sedgwick ordered Burns to send one regiment back to its old position to serve 
as a picket for the division.  Burns selected the California Regiment.  It advanced only to 
find Confederate skirmishers in the abandoned camp with large bodies of infantry 
coming up behind them.  Faced with being swamped by the oncoming Confederates, the 
regiment withdrew to Allen’s Farm, a position in front of the main Union line, where 
they were supported by two flanking regiments.  There they prepared to receive the 
advancing Georgians of Colonel George Anderson’s brigade.48 
 At this time, about 9:00 a.m., Sedgwick directed Burns to take command of the 
line at Allen’s Farm.  Burns accompanied a pair of batteries forward, directing them into 
position to support his troops.  Determining that he needed more troops, the Ohioan 
headed back towards the main line, halting after finding a fresh regiment, the 53rd 
Pennsylvania, behind a house 100 yards to the rear of the advance line.  Colonel John 
Brooke, commander of the 53rd, at first refused to move his men, insisting that this was 
where his brigade commander wanted him.  Angered, Burns snapped that as commander 
of this line his orders would be obeyed, and Brooke relented.  Thus reinforced, the line at 
Allen’s Farm held against Anderson’s probing attacks, and the fighting sputtered out 
shortly after 11:00 a.m.  The California Regiment, the only formation of Burns’ brigade 
involved in the fight, suffered thirty casualties that morning, including six killed.49 
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 Knowing that Confederates could be advancing past his flanks at any time, 
Sumner ordered Sedgwick to march his division the last two miles to Savage Station as 
quickly as possible.  Burns put his men on the road in the blazing July sun shortly after 
noon.  Heat and exhaustion took their toll and the oncoming enemy swept up stragglers.  
By 3:00 p. m. Burns’ trailing regiments were crossing through the previously established 
lines at Savage Station;  they rested behind the lines and watched the burning of the 
remaining supplies at that place.  Little rest could be found before a crisis loomed.50 
 At about 4:30 p. m. Confederate troops, a brigade of South Carolinians 
commanded by Brigadier General Joseph B. Kershaw, were sighted by Sedgwick 
emerging into a clearing along the Williamsburg Road, headed east towards Savage 
Station.  Union Brigadier General Samuel P. Heintzelman, whose Third Corps covered 
that approach earlier in the day, had concluded that his troops were not needed at Savage 
Station and put them on the march south towards White Oak Swamp early that afternoon 
without notifying Sumner.  Kershaw’s rebels now approached the completely exposed 
flank of Sumner’s corps.  Alarmed, Sumner answered the threat with the first units he 
could find:  two regiments of Burns’ Philadelphia Brigade.51 
 Burns advanced his two regiments, the 72nd and 106th Pennsylvania Volunteers, a 
half-mile westward into a wide clearing bordered to the south by the Williamsburg Road 
and to the north by the Richmond & York River Railroad.  Despite the urgency of the 
situation, Burns maintained a sense of calm and discipline, making sure the move, 
“although executed with great promptness, was performed as deliberately as if on 
parade.”52  Burns placed his regiments in front of a north-south running fence 500 yards 
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into the clearing, thirty paces from the woods that formed its western edge.  He threw 
out skirmishers into the woods to his front, they quickly returned to report that a large 
body of enemy infantry was advancing through the woods and would be upon his 
position soon.  Burns, who had already decided two regiments were not enough to cover 
the entire clearing, used the brief interlude to send back an urgent request to Sumner for 
reinforcements.  Sumner sent the first regiment he came across, Lieutenant Colonel 
Stephen Miller’s 1st Minnesota, then ordered Burns’ other two regiments to go to their 
commander’s aid.53 
 Sections of four different batteries had been rushed to the field and Miller’s 
Minnesotans advanced through the clearing with shot and shell whistling over their 
heads as the Union artillerists suppressed their rebel counterparts beyond and to either 
side of the woods to Burns’ front.   Burns ordered Miller to take position on the left of 
the 106th, with his own left flank refused across the Williamsburg Road, covering against 
any flanking maneuver attempted by Confederates on the other side.  Equally concerned 
about potential enemy moves north of the railroad, Burns sidled the 72nd down the line 
until its right flank touched the railbed, opening a significant gap between that regiment 
and the 106th in the center of the line.  The dispositions left both his flanks in the air in 
addition to the dangerous gap in his center, yet there was little else Burns could do 
except hold on and wait for more reinforcements.  Even as he completed these 
adjustments, sometime during the 5:00 o’clock hour, firing erupted in the woods to his 
front between his skirmishers and the advancing Confederates.  Moments later, the front 
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ranks of three regiments of South Carolina infantry burst forth from the tree-line, aimed 
directly at the gap.54  
 Burns raced to the threatened point as the opposing troops, not even twenty-five 
paces apart, leveled muskets and loosed volleys into each other’s massed ranks.  “The 
battle raged along the whole line,” Burns recalled, “[concentrating] gradually toward my 
two weak points, the center and the Williamsburg road.”55  Momentarily checked by the 
daunting fire of the Pennsylvanians, the Confederates gathered themselves and charged 
into the open seam between the 72nd and the 106th.  With the short distance between the 
two sides, there was little time for Burns or any of the other Yankee soldiers to react.  
Burns, standing just behind his line, was struck in the right cheek by a minie ball.  
Unfazed, the brigadier bandaged the wound with the silk handkerchief he always wore 
about his neck to ward off chills and continued on, “his beard and clothes clotted with 
blood; still he encouraged his officers and men” to hold the line.56 
 At nearly the same time, Confederate fire killed the captain of the left-most 
company of the 72nd; leaderless, the unit fell back in the face of hand-to-hand fighting, 
further opening the gap in Burns’ line.  With their own right flank under pressure and 
now uncovered, the 106th also fell back across the fence towards the eastern side of the 
clearing.  It seemed that the Philadelphia Brigade, despite the exhortations of their 
bloodstained commander, was coming apart at the seams.    Men from the 2nd and 3rd 
South Carolina regiments reached the fence and “flaunted their flag across the rails,” 
preparing to pursue the fleeing Yankees.  Then good fortune intervened on the side of 
the Federals.57 
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 As the fighting broke out in the center of Burns’ line, Lieutenant Colonel Miller 
of the 1st Minnesota could see Confederates from Brigadier General Paul J. Semmes’ 
brigade advancing south of the Williamsburg Road.  Miller moved his regiment up to be 
even with the rest of Burns’ line and refused his left flank across the road.  This move 
protected Burns’ left and forced the Confederates to work their way through the thick 
woods south of the road looking to get behind Miller’s left.  As Burns’ line was falling 
back, Semmes ran headlong into the Vermont regiments of Brigadier General W. T. H. 
Brooks’ brigade, from William Franklin’s Sixth Corps.  A vicious firefight erupted 
between the two brigades.58 
 The sudden gunfire behind their right flank distracted the South Carolina 
regiments attacking Burns.  Already taking losses from the Union artillery, and 
prevented by the wooded terrain from seeing what was happening to their right, the 
Confederates hesitated, declining to pursue the retreating Pennsylvanians across the 
clearing.  Mysterious orders to stop firing were repeated down the line.  These orders 
had no clear source and the rebel officers debated whether or not to give them any 
weight.  Confusion reigned for precious minutes and eventually two of the three 
attacking regiments pulled back into the trees, leaving their more stubborn comrades 
alone and exposed at the fence near the road.59 
Burns was not slow in capitalizing on this respite.  He regrouped the 72nd and the 
106th, then started taking advantage of the reinforcements now arriving in the form of 
individual regiments forwarded by Sumner as he came across them.  Seeing the trouble 
facing the 1st Minnesota on the left, Burns sent his own 69th Pennsylvania Volunteers to 
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support their left flank.  As he organized a counterattack towards the fence, Burns 
spotted the 88th New York moving up the road at the double-quick; fired up by a speech 
from Sumner before he sent them off, this Irish regiment was just looking for someone 
to charge.  Wisely, Burns pointed out the lone Confederate regiment up by the fence and 
got out of the way.  The New Yorkers drove the last rebels from the fence and chased 
them into the woods, effectively ending the fighting north of the road.  “Victory,” Burns 
reported, “can fairly be claimed by us.”60 
Perhaps Burns’ most important contribution at Savage Station was to 
counterbalance the ineptness shown by Sumner in managing the battle.  Even with 
Heintzelman’s departure, Sumner outnumbered Magruder, and he had Franklin close by 
for support.  Instead of marshalling his brigades for a counterstroke to cripple the Army 
of the Potomac’s closest pursuer, Sumner haphazardly threw single regiments in Burns’ 
direction, leaving the bulk of his command unengaged.  Fortunately for Sumner, Burns 
proved to be a steady hand in a crisis.  Even under great duress he maintained his 
composure and the hard work put into drilling his troops since he assumed command 
prevented a repeat of Ball’s Bluff after their line was pierced.  Sedgwick praised his 
subordinate’s “great daring and excellent judgement in the disposition of his troops.”61 
 After dark the Philadelphia Brigade joined the rest of Sumner’s corps in 
continuing the retreat towards White Oak Swamp.  Burns’ hard-won victory at Savage 
Station was rendered hollow when the haste of their retreat forced the abandonment of a 
hospital established at Savage Station earlier in the campaign.  Over 3,000 men were left 
to become Confederate prisoners, including many from the Philadelphia Brigade who 
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fell during that day’s fighting.  Heartsick, the brigadier “mourned the necessity of 
leaving behind so many brave men, wounded and dying, who had done so well in the 
fight.”62 
 By mid-morning the Army of the Potomac had made its escape through White 
Oak Swamp.  Lee focused his efforts on concentrating the bulk of his army for a strike at 
Glendale, a strategically located crossroads town.  McClellan’s army was stretched out 
along the road running south through Glendale to Malverton.  A breakthrough at the 
crossroads would split the Union army in two and present an opportunity for Lee to 
destroy the segment isolated between Glendale and White Oak Swamp.  McClellan 
recognized that danger and distributed his troops in defensive positions to the north and 
west of Glendale in order to keep the roads open for his supply train and the troops 
moving south from White Oak Swamp.  Making what could have been a disastrous 
choice, McClellan posted Brigadier General George McCall’s Pennsylvania division to 
guard the Long Bridge Road, the most convenient point of approach for Longstreet’s 
Confederates coming from west of Glendale; McCall’s division had taken a beating at 
Gaines’ Mill three days prior.63 
 Lee’s complex plan involved attacks from several different directions, most 
significantly a holding attack by Jackson coming from the north through White Oak 
Swamp and the main blow coming from the west at the hands of James Longstreet.  
Following what had become a pattern throughout the campaign, this plan fell apart when 
the generals involved failed to coordinate, Jackson in particular failing to do anything 
other than conduct an artillery duel early in the afternoon.  Feeling a sense of urgency as 
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he watched his opportunity slip away, Lee ordered Longstreet to attack on his own.  
Longstreet moved forward directly into McCall.  In under an hour of fierce fighting the 
Confederate attack wrecked McCall’s division and opened a gaping hole in the center of 
the line defending Glendale.  The Army of the Potomac was in grave danger.64 
 Sedgwick’s division was posted outside Glendale as an area reserve.  Sumner’s 
other divisions were already positioned near White Oak Swamp to guard against the 
threat of Jackson.  The corps commander responded to Jackson’s limited movement 
earlier in the day by releasing two of Sedgwick’s brigades to support the defenses in that 
direction, leaving Burns’ brigade as the nearest reserve to the point of Longstreet’s 
attack.  Unfortunately for Burns, Sumner stayed at Glendale with the Philadelphia 
Brigade.  When the shooting started, the veteran corps commander found himself with 
nothing better to do than personally supervise the movements of the one brigade he had 
on hand.  Responding to urgent requests for reinforcements from Brigadier General Joe 
Hooker, whose division held the line to the left of McCall, Sumner scattered Burns’ 
regiments.  Two went to Hooker and Burns was directed to take the 72nd to the aid of the 
remnants of McCall’s division still desperately trying to hold their position.65 
 Burns’ men proved capable of performing admirably even without the presence 
of their brigade commander.  Hooker directed the 69th, commanded by Colonel Joshua 
Owen, to fill the gap between his right and McCall’s left.  Only moments after they 
arrived, the remainder of McCall’s division broke for good, abandoning their artillery as 
they scattered in the face of a determined Confederate attack and fled through the ranks 
of the 69th.  After firing a volley to slow down the onrushing rebels, Owen gave the 
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order to fix bayonets.  “Heroically led by Owen,” Hooker reported, “[the 69th] advanced 
in the open field . . . with almost reckless daring.”66  Owen’s charge drove the 
Confederates back across the field and recaptured McCall’s guns.  Burns’ pride shows 
through in his report with the exuberant exclamation:  “Gallant Sixty-ninth!”67 
 Near the other end of McCall’s line, Burns was also trying to deal with the 
sudden collapse.  Sedgwick’s other brigades were now on the scene and Burns received 
four regiments, including his own 71st Pennsylvania, to reinforce his position.  Another 
Confederate attack routed two regiments fighting to Burns’ left, exposing the all-
important road through another gap in the Union line.  Burns quickly filled the breach 
with the 71st Pennsylvania and the 19th Massachusetts, reporting later that “these two 
noble regiments met the enemy face to face, and for nearly one hour poured into them 
such tremendous volleys that no further attack was had at that vital point.”68  In the 
meantime, Burns chased the two fleeing regiments and “rode into their midst, and by his 
appeals to their pride succeeded in stopping their retreat and turning their faces again 
towards the enemy.”69  With his line stabilized, Burns held there until darkness fell and 
ended the fighting. 
 Burns again proved his worth during the battle of Glendale.  Sumner listed him 
among a handful of officers to whom “the country is indebted for very important 
services in this action.”70  The Philadelphia Brigade’s historian recorded that “General 
Burns won the highest praise and the enthusiastic admiration of his men” at Glendale.71  
Burns cut a dramatic figure during the fighting:  “Wherever the fight seemed to be the 
hottest, there was Burns with his face stained with blood, cheering and rallying the 
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men.”72  Even a painful fall from his horse while attempting to jump a ditch could not 
slow down the feisty Ohioan. 73  The commissary captain had become quite the warrior 
general, building a record that compared favorably with any other brigade commander in 
the Army of the Potomac. 
 Burns’ role in this campaign essentially ended after the battle of Glendale.  With 
the road uncut, McClellan was able to pull his troops in behind a formidable defensive 
line established at Malvern Hill, outside Malverton.  Lee’s frontal attack against that 
position the next day resulted only in the pointless slaughter of Confederate soldiers, 
bringing his pursuit of the Union army to a close.  Other than some long-range artillery 
fire that killed two of his men, Burns and his brigade were mostly observers during the 
battle of Malvern Hill.  A week later, Burns finally fell victim to “[his] wound, malaria, 
and twenty-eight days of constant strain.”74  His facial wound grew infected, and Burns 
was ordered back to Philadelphia to recuperate.75     
 Burns demonstrated himself to be a valuable asset to the Army of the Potomac 
during the Peninsular Campaign.  He was a steady hand in the field, unfazed by 
moments of crisis, responding quickly and intelligently to each emergency.  Perhaps 
more importantly, his thorough training of the Philadelphia Brigade and emphasis on 
discipline paid off; the men of the brigade did not break, even under extreme stress.  
Their retreat under duress at Savage Station bore no resemblance to the rout at Ball’s 
Bluff.  They regrouped at the first possible moment and maintained their combat 
effectiveness.  Their 405 casualties, including 40 killed, could have been far worse had 
the bonds of discipline slacked at any point during the Seven Days.  It is to Burns’ great 
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credit that he left his brigade in immeasurably better shape than that in which he found it 
eight months before.  His star was on the rise.76 
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CHAPTER IV 
FALL FROM GRACE 
 
 A hard recuperation awaited Burns in Philadelphia.  His facial wound would not 
close properly, forcing Burns to endure the agony of having the wound cauterized every 
other day at first, tapering off to twice a week until the gash that the minie ball left in his 
cheek finally healed.  Recovering from this treatment and a case of malaria required 
many more weeks of rest.  It was October before Burns was ready to resume command.1 
 Burns found the Philadelphia Brigade at Harpers Ferry on October 9, where the 
Army of the Potomac rested in the wake of the Antietam campaign.  It must have pained 
Burns to discover how many faces were missing.  Sedgwick’s division had been mauled 
during the battle of Antietam and the Philadelphia Brigade had taken its share of the 
losses.  Despite this, or perhaps because of it, the men of the brigade were overjoyed to 
have their old commander back.  They turned out to greet him that afternoon with cheers 
and applause, moving Burns to the point that he trusted his voice only long enough to 
ask, “How do you do, men?”2 
 This reunion was short-lived.  Burns’ strong performance during the Peninsular 
Campaign had not gone unnoticed among the upper echelons of the Army of the 
Potomac.  Sedgwick, writing to Sumner, praised “the gallantry of Brigadier General 
Burns, and respectfully submit that a grade [promotion] is but a small recompense for his 
services.”3  Sumner agreed, forwarding Sedgwick’s recommendation on to McClellan.  
The army commander, who had always thought well of Burns, was lavish in his own 
praise:  “[Generals Sedgwick and Sumner] have not over-rated the importance of the 
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services provided by General Burns . . . [his conduct] was something more than that 
display of gallantry which every brigade commander ought to possess.”4  On November 
2, less than a month after his return, Burns was relieved of command of the Philadelphia 
Brigade and ordered to report to Major General Ambrose Burnside to become a division 
commander in his Ninth Corps.  Burns assumed his new post with the First Division a 
few days later.5 
 In sharp contrast to the hard feelings created among his soldiers when he first 
took command of the Philadelphia Brigade, Burns’ departure provoked an outpouring of 
“regrets at parting so brave and sterling a soldier.”6  The stern Regular Army officer was 
now “regarded with the affections due to a parent, for he had . . . brought us all to a 
perfect state of discipline, and to him we owe most of our military education;  there were 
none of his old command who did not feel that he had won his promotion, and that he 
would rise to a still higher grade, as all felt sure that his abilities greatly exceeded his 
new position.”7  As he left the camp, after turning over command to one of his colonels, 
the entire brigade, drawn up in line, greeted Burns.  He rode down the line, receiving the 
well wishes of his men, stopping in front of the 69th to say, “Men, always do your duty 
as well as you have done and you will always be victorious.  Good bye.”8  Then, buoyed 
by three cheers, Burns set off down the road to greater things. 
 His new unit was happy to have the services of the feisty Ohioan.  Burns was 
given First Division, replacing Brigadier General Orlando B. Willcox, now acting 
commander of the Ninth Corps after McClellan was relieved and Burnside promoted to 
take his place as commander of Army of the Potomac.  Writing to his wife the day after 
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Burns arrived, Willcox, who had known Burns at West Point, spoke of being “very glad 
to have [him].”9  Elaborating on the subject in a letter written two weeks later, Willcox 
explained that Burns “is one of my classmates & a first rate soldier.  Every thing works 
smoothly & well in the division.”10  It seemed fortunate that this was so, for Burns and 
his division would find themselves standing on the north bank of the Rappahannock 
River three weeks later, waiting to cross along with the rest of the Army of the Potomac 
to assault Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Fredericksburg. 
 McClellan was relieved due to a lack of aggressiveness, an attribute not lacking 
in Burnside.  The new commander immediately set in motion a design for a decisive 
thrust at Richmond.  Fredericksburg was the key to Burnside’s plan, a strategically 
located crossing point on the lower Rappahannock.  Lee’s army was widely separated in 
early November, with Longstreet’s corps guarding crossings along the upper 
Rappahannock and Jackson’s corps protecting the Shenandoah Valley.  Burnside 
intended to hold Longstreet with a demonstration while the bulk of his army marched the 
thirty-six miles to Fredericksburg and crossed the river before the Confederates could 
react.11 
 Burnside’s plan seemed to work at first.  Lead elements of the Army of the 
Potomac arrived at Fredericksburg on November 17, so far ahead of any Confederate 
response that Lee initially conceded the crossing, planning to make a stand farther south.  
Unfortunately for the Union commander, the lower Rappahannock had been rendered 
unfordable by heavy rains.  Burnside’s plan anticipated this, calling for pontoon bridges 
to meet his army at Fredericksburg for an immediate crossing.  A combination of bad 
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luck and incompetence caused the pontoons to be delayed, not arriving until November 
25, by which time Lee and Longstreet were waiting for Burnside on the imposing 
heights across the river.  Frustrated, Burnside wasted two more weeks searching for 
alternatives to his original plan, finally announcing on December 9 that the army would 
cross at Fredericksburg after all.  The crossing took time, and Burnside was not prepared 
to attack Lee until December 13, with the Army of Northern Virginia reunited to oppose 
him.12 
 Willcox’s Ninth Corps was now part of Edwin Sumner’s Right Grand Division 
after Burnside’s reorganization of the Army of the Potomac prior to this campaign.   
Burns’ division started the battle on the left end of Sumner’s line, maintaining the link 
between Sumner’s Grand Division and Major General William B. Franklin’s Left Grand 
Division, with orders to respond to Franklin “if called upon.”13  Franklin made a half-
hearted attack on “Stonewall” Jackson’s half of the Confederate line, then, fearing a 
counterattack, called on Burns around 3:00 p.m. to shift further left to cover the pontoon 
bridge behind his sector of the Union line.  Here Burns spent the remainder of the 13th, 
Franklin later explaining that “it would have been imprudent to have taken [his division] 
away.”14  In this Burns was fortunate;  Franklin’s decision quite possibly spared his 
division from joining the futile assaults against Longstreet’s entrenchments on Mayre’s 
Heights.  As it was, Burns’ division incurred only a handful of losses from long-range 
artillery and sniper fire:  two killed, forty-three wounded, and three captured during the 
battle.15  As historian George C. Rable notes, the worst experience of the day for Burns 
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and his men was watching the distant slaughter on Mayre’s Heights and dealing with the 
growing fear that they might be called upon to make the next attempt.16 
 Burnside’s bloody failure on the 13th did not immediately dissuade him from 
resuming the attack on the 14th.  Ninth Corps, having survived the 13th relatively intact, 
was ordered to prepare for a new assault to take place the next morning.  Burns viewed 
the prospects of such an attack realistically, remarking to Willcox that he “expected to 
go as far towards the stone wall as any, but as a general he was bound to say that he . . . 
considered this attack with one corps of twelve thousand men murder and not war.”17  
However, Burns’ luck held, and Burnside canceled the attack after his subordinates, 
especially Sumner, objected to continuing the slaughter.  Burnside withdrew the Army 
of the Potomac back across the Rappahannock on the night of December 15, ending the 
short campaign.  Fredericksburg was a disaster, but Burns proved to be capable as a 
division commander and his star remained untarnished.18 
 William S. Rosecrans, now a major general commanding the Army of the 
Cumberland, in East Tennessee, had been pleading with Major General Henry W. 
Halleck, general-in-chief of all Union armies, for talented generals to be sent his way 
since at least November.  His calls intensified in early January, 1863, in the aftermath of 
the battle of Murfreesboro, a near-defeat during which Rosecrans had found some of his 
subordinates wanting.  He complained to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton that his army 
was “very short of general officers,” and implored Halleck to send him “one, two, or 
three good division commanders.”19  Having been turned down in some of his requests 
for specific generals, Rosecrans focused on a new target:  Burns.  On January 24 he 
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wrote Burns, “I have telegraphed General Halleck asking if you can be spared to be 
assigned to this department.  Would such an arrangement suit you?”20  Rosecrans initial 
request had been denied by Burnside, who considered Burns too valuable to lose and had 
him earmarked for a future corps command.  The issue seemed decided until, also on the 
24th, Joseph Hooker replaced Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac.21   
Hoping to placate Rosecrans, Halleck wired him on the 28th, reluctantly granting 
that, “If General Hooker will consent, you shall have General Burns.  You already have 
your full share of the best officers.”22  However, Hooker as well declined at first to part 
with Burns, explaining that “he had too few fighting generals now.”23  Stymied twice, it 
took one more turn of events to free Burns to go west:  Ninth Corps was detached from 
the Army of the Potomac.  With Burns leaving his command anyway, Hooker consented 
to the transfer.  On February 2, Hooker issued the order for “Brigadier General William 
W. Burns, U. S. Volunteers, at the earnest request of General Rosecrans, is relieved from 
duty with the Ninth Corps,” to report to the Army of the Cumberland.24 
 Burns believed that Rosecrans wanted him to take over the corps commanded by 
Major General Alexander M. McCook.  An unpopular self-promoter, McCook had not 
distinguished himself during the battle of Murfreesboro; his corps suffering heavily at 
the hands of the Confederate surprise attack that opened the fight.  If this was Rosecrans’ 
intention, he must have communicated it privately to Burns.  None of his official 
requests mention anything other than his desire for more competent brigade and division 
commanders.  A statement by Rosecrans made in support of Burns to the House of 
Representatives after the war expressed only his desire for Burns’ “services,” not 
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mentioning in what capacity.25  It is certainly possible that Rosecrans and Burns had a 
private understanding of what his role would be, but it is noteworthy in light of the 
events that would follow that Rosecrans never officially made clear his plans for 
Burns.26 
 Burns’ departure from the Army of the Potomac did not go unnoticed.  On the 
same day he received his orders, Burns was the recipient of an extraordinary gift from 
members of his old command, the Philadelphia Brigade: 
On February 7th, the Seventy-Second Regiment presented General W. W. Burns, 
their former brigade commander, with a magnificent sword, sash and belt costing 
over six hundred dollars, on the eve of his departure for the west.  It possessed 
peculiar interest from the fact that it was entirely a gift of the rank and file, and 
the presentation speech was made by Sergeant Faber, of Company I, on behalf of 
the non-commissioned officers and privates [emphasis in original].  General 
Burns received it, replying gratefully and briefly, saying that he came as a 
stranger to succeed Colonel Baker, whom we had all learned to idolize.  “A 
brilliant orator, a Senator, a man whose personal attractions won all hearts,” and 
he being only a soldier how hard it was for him to gain our confidence and love;  
thanking them for the gift, he closed as follows: 
“I am no longer your general, but will always be your friend and proud of 
your success.  I came to the Army of the Potomac at the instance of 
General McClellan.  Burnside and Hooker are my friends.  I leave with a 
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sad heart, but Rosecrans wants me in the West, there the star of my 
destiny directs me.  Farewell.  God bless you.” 
The sword was one of rare beauty and great costliness, the blade pure Damascus, 
the handle a fine specimen of work in gold, diamonds, amethyst, turquoise, and 
other precious stones, having forty-one diamonds in the letters W. W. B. and U. 
S.;  on the scabbard in gold bas-relief was an equestrian representation of 
General Burns leading his men, the coat of arms of Pennsylvania, a camp scene 
and a battle scene;  certainly a magnificent souvenir.27 
According to such a testimonial, Burns left the Army of the Potomac far more popular 
with the men who served him than when he arrived.  He headed west full of confidence 
in his own ability and in that path which the star of his destiny illuminated, alive with the 
possibility of greater glory and rapid advancement. 
 Working under the assumption that he would be elevated to a corps command, 
Burns considered it a priority to make sure he headed west as a major general, the 
necessary rank for such a post.  Burnside told Burns that he had been appointed a major 
general on November 29, 1862, pending confirmation by the Senate at some point during 
the current session.  With this in mind, Burns followed the example of many of his 
colleagues and attempted to cultivate some political allies.  He wrote to Senator John 
Sherman, Republican of Ohio, in early January, asking him to bring his name up before 
that body for confirmation.  Sounding somewhat confused by Burns’ appeal, Sherman 
replied, “From the high merit as a soldier attributed to you on all hands I will cheerfully 
ask your appointment as Major General—but I think General Burnside is mistaken in 
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supposing any weight will be attached to a recommendation of a Senator.  Such is not 
my experience.”28  Not reassured by this exchange, Burns’ first destination after leaving 
the Army of the Potomac was Washington, D.C., where he intended to make sure he got 
his commission before Congress adjourned on March 4.29 
 Burns started at the Adjutant General’s office, learning from Assistant Adjutant 
General James B. Fry that his appointment to major general had been withdrawn.  In 
alarm, Burns went straight to the White House, where Lincoln seemed cooperative.  The 
President handed Burns a note to be shown to Stanton and Halleck, stating that he was 
“very willing” for Burns to become a major general if Stanton and Halleck saw “no valid 
objection.”30  From there Burns took his note to the War Department, where Halleck 
“declined to make any endorsement saying that he had already recommended me and 
others and that politicians interfered and rendered his recommendations [pointless].”31  
With Halleck washing his hands of further involvement, Burns continued his quest to 
Stanton’s office.32 
 Burns found the Secretary of War to appear quite accommodating.  In reassuring 
tones, Stanton told the general that his appointment had not been withdrawn;  he claimed 
to have the paperwork there in his office and proceeded to search for it as Halleck 
entered the room.  Unsuccessful in his search, Stanton looked up at Halleck and asked, 
“we made General Burns a Major General did we not?”33  Halleck answered in the 
affirmative and Stanton proceeded to write up a new order for Burns’ appointment to 
major general, back-dating it to November 29, 1862.  Handing the paper to Burns, the 
secretary showered him with more assurances that his new rank would take effect “from 
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tomorrow and you can rest satisfied.”34  Burns took his appointment down to the adjutant 
general’s office and watched it be recorded, but remained unconvinced that the matter 
was resolved. 
 His subsequent destinations were the offices of five of the seven members of the 
Senate Committee on Military Affairs.  Burns knew that the list of appointees pending 
confirmation from this session of Congress was a long one and that there was no 
guarantee his name would come up.  He urged the committee members to accommodate 
the request of General Rosecrans and make sure his own appointment was confirmed.  
According to Burns, he received the assurances of these men that his name would go 
through.35   
 One last stop was added to his odyssey through the streets of Washington when 
he was sent for by Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, another leading Ohio 
Republican.  Chase explained that he had received letters from Hooker and Rosecrans 
requesting support for Burns’ promotion;  he expressed his own confidence in Burns and 
inquired about the status of his appointment.  Burns explained that he now had 
“assurances from the President and Sec. of War as to my commission,” but he had 
concerns about “the possibility of my name not being sent [to the Senate].”36  Chase 
countered with an alarming reply:  “Stanton is deceiving you.”37  He offered no 
explanation for his claim, but promised Burns he would see Lincoln in the morning 
about pushing the general’s confirmation through the Senate.  Burns may have found no 
small comfort in this, for “Chase’s voice was influential in determining military 
appointments,” especially for Ohio men.38  At that juncture, Burns evidently decided he 
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had done all he could to influence events.  He left Washington and headed west on 
February 13.39 
 It is interesting to note in light of what would follow that Burns approached 
mostly Republicans in his quest for political allies to support his promotion to major 
general.  He likely drew a distinction between radicals such as Stanton and the members 
of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War and those Republicans he considered 
to be more moderate in their political positions.  He also appears to have considered 
those politicians from his own home state to be more likely to help than others.  
 Congress adjourned as scheduled on March 4, by which time Burns was in 
Cincinnati, waiting for news of his promotion.  A list was published of the thirty officers 
whose appointments to major general were confirmed by the Senate, with Burns’ name 
nowhere to be found.  Burns was outraged.  From commanding a division and 
anticipating commanding a corps, the general now sat hundreds of miles from the 
fighting, without a command, fuming.  His reassurances from Lincoln, Stanton, Chase, 
and the members of the Committee on Military Affairs had proven worthless.  Burns felt 
betrayed, and he assigned responsibility for his torment to the target already illuminated 
for him by Chase:  Edwin M. Stanton.40 
 Burns was predisposed to see treachery in Stanton, for his politics and choice of 
friends set him at odds with the Secretary of War.  Burns was a conservative Democrat 
whose parents were born in Virginia and whose wife was from Kentucky.  He declared 
at the beginning of the war that he “[did] not feel animosity to the people who have 
thrown down the gauntlet of defiance to the government.  I have no wish to see them 
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destroyed.”41  Like McClellan, Burns wanted only to preserve the Union and bring about 
a reconciliation between North and South, not to break the Southern aristocracy and free 
the slaves.  His views on slavery are not recorded, but he was careful to point out that 
“hostility” between North and South “does exist aside from the question of slavery.”42   
 Burns’ opinions mirrored those of other generals with Democratic sympathies, 
such as McClellan and Winfield S. Hancock, and Stanton found those opinions 
reprehensible.  A prominent antebellum lawyer, the Secretary of War had transformed 
since 1860 from a long-time Democrat into an abolitionist, Radical Republican.  
Attorney General for the last months of the term of Lincoln’s predecessor, Democrat 
James Buchanan, Stanton was an advisor to and supporter of McClellan after the general 
was called to Washington in the aftermath of Bull Run.  Stanton professed to share 
McClellan’s views on how the war should be conducted and had the general’s support 
when Lincoln, looking to appease Democrats in Congress, named him Secretary of War 
in January 1862.  Following his appointment, perhaps because of the association with the 
largely Radical Republican members of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War 
required by his new position, Stanton underwent a stunning transformation into one of 
the most radical of Radicals.43 
Stanton the Radical hated the South, hated its slave culture, aristocratic social 
structure, and the perceived arrogance with which southern politicians pushed the 
interests of their region.  According to historian Bruce Tap, Stanton and his fellow 
Radicals argued that “the only hope for breaking the rebellion was to . . . crush the Slave 
Power and allow a reorganization of southern society according to the dynamic model of 
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northern free labor.”44  To make matters worse, Stanton also despised West Pointers.  He 
believed them “permeated with the ancient notions of war . . . unable to realize that this 
is a Republic, in which the people are above generals, instead of generals above the 
people.”45  West Pointers, Radicals argued, were more interested in playing war by an 
archaic set of rules with their former friends than in winning the war against the enemy 
by any means necessary, evoking social change in the rebelling states in the process.  In 
the view of Stanton’s biographers, there was no room in Stanton’s army for Democrats 
who “formed . . . centers in the Army for pockets of conservative sentiment regarding 
slavery.”46  To Stanton’s way of thinking, a general’s political reliability was far more 
important than his military experience or demonstrated ability.47 
 If Stanton disliked West Pointers in general, he saved particular venom for a 
specific Military Academy graduate:  one-time friend George McClellan.  McClellan 
epitomized the type, a conservative Democrat, soft on slavery, who spoke of 
reconciliation with the seceding states and seemed unwilling to take harsh measures 
against the rebels.  The erstwhile allies clashed as the Secretary of War gravitated farther 
and farther away from the general’s views during McClellan’s time in command of the 
Army of the Potomac.  Great disappointments on the Peninsula and during the Antietam 
campaign provided Stanton with the opportunity to convince Lincoln to replace 
McClellan with Ambrose Burnside.  Having become and ardent Radical, the Secretary of 
War could never tolerate a general he believed "felt just as pleasantly toward the enemy 
in front of him as he would if he had been on the other side.”48 
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 Even worse, from Stanton’s new point of view, McClellan was a charismatic 
conservative Democrat who cultivated a coterie of like-minded officers within the Army 
of the Potomac.  Burns was part of this clique, a young officer who caught McClellan’s 
eye back in Ohio in 1861 and had proved himself after being given an opportunity to 
succeed.  Burns described his “heartfelt desolation” at the time of McClellan’s removal, 
holding “true to the conviction that . . . McClellan is the only man who can save this 
country from permanent disruption and our army from disaster.”49  His devotion to 
McClellan achieved a religious purity, inspiring Burns to declare that “God in his 
wisdom . . . choses [sic] instruments among us to carry out his will . . . I believe that the 
characteristics of Geo. B. McClellan make him the fitting instrument to conquer this 
Rebellion and save this nation.”50  Burns surely was aware, as Stanton’s biographers put 
it, that “the generals who ran afoul of [Stanton] . . . had shown too much . . . Democratic 
partisanship.”51  Given these irreconcilable philosophical differences with Stanton, it 
seemed logical to Burns that the Secretary of War was his betrayer.52 
 Believing there was no relief to be found at the War Department, in March 1863 
Burns decided to appeal directly to the President.  Typical of a nineteenth century officer 
when a slight was perceived, he chose a letter of resignation as his method, explaining 
later that, “Held up to the eyes of the Army . . . as a conspicuous object of  . . . sleight . . 
. He had no honorable alternative than to ask an explanation of the President of the 
cause, demand a Court of Inquiry, if a cause, or tender his resignation if no cause.”53  
Making liberal use of melodramatic flourishes, especially in regards to the state of his 
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health, Burns threw himself upon Lincoln’s mercy in a letter of resignation dated March 
6: 
I have the honor to tender the resignation of my Commission of Brigadier 
General of Volunteers, my reasons are the most powerful that a solider can offer, 
vis, want of confidence in my ability.  I am awakened to this painful fact by the 
very palpable decision of those empowered to judge who have set me aside in 
promotion for merit.  After my trial of fifteen year service, I might consider that I 
was still thought capable to assume command of a Brigade, but the humiliation 
has so broken my military spirit and my health, that now I’m ashamed and unable 
to assume command over men again.  My want of self-reliance would involve 
disaster, and I will not hazzard [sic] the lives of brave men who would distrust 
me and fail.  I can serve my country more effectively, without shame, in the 
subsistence department.  It may be that my loyalty is impugned, in these times of 
suspicion . . . I would gladly avail myself of the privilege of the laws and demand 
a Court of Inquiry.  I will await your decision at Dayton, Ohio.54 
Burns’ hopes of executive intervention were dashed when Lincoln accepted his 
resignation without comment.55 
 Was Burns the victim of ill will on the part of Secretary Stanton?  Could this 
have been the desired result of a sinister plot?  Stanton had certainly not proven averse to 
removing other generals whom he considered untrustworthy.  On January 21, 1863, Fitz 
John Porter, a McClellan favorite, was found guilty by a court-martial of “failure to obey 
lawful orders, and misbehavior before the enemy” for his failure to support Major 
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General John Pope at the battle of Second Manassas.56  While Porter deserved censure 
for his actions during that fight, according to historian Stephen Sears his real crime was 
to be “the highly visible representation of McClellanism, the disease the general’s 
detractors defined as bad blood and paralysis infecting much of the officer corps of the 
Army of the Potomac.”57 
 Four days after Porter’s conviction, Burnside was removed from command, not 
only because of a loss of confidence in his ability after Fredericksburg, but because his 
authority was undermined by a group of his subordinates who wished to see McClellan’s 
triumphant return.  General William Franklin led this effort, and he was relieved of his 
command on the same day as Burnside.  While Franklin’s removal was well deserved, 
Stanton’s biographers point out that “it was widely rumored that other ‘McClellanite’ 
officers were destined for similar treatment.”58  Indeed, Republican suspicions regarding 
the political reliability of the Army of the Potomac’s generals seemed confirmed, 
provoking Radical congressmen to begin “what amounted to a campaign of 
extermination against Democratic generals,” with Stanton’s enthusiastic support.59  For 
his part, Lincoln “made no serious effort to soften the blows which rained down . . . 
upon the heads of McClellan’s friends in the Army.”60  Against this background, it 
becomes easier to see how Burns could imagine duplicity on the part of Stanton. 
 Interestingly, there are examples of Stanton intervening on the behalf of officers 
who believed themselves wronged on some account.  Responding to a letter of 
resignation from a state militia captain, disappointed that he had lost his post as provost 
marshal for the Allegheny District due to a new rule implemented by Lincoln requiring 
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such posts to be filled by higher ranking officers, Stanton wrote, “In view of your 
services during the war, and my personal confidence in your ability . . . I am reluctant to 
have you leave the service,” and that “another arrangement . . . can be made.”61  It is 
odd, barring a request from a political ally, that the Secretary of War would make an 
effort to dissuade a captain from resigning but would not do so for a general with Burns’ 
record. 
 This evidence is circumstantial, proving nothing except that Burns’ resignation 
generated a high degree of apathy at the War Department, given significance only by the 
knowledge of Stanton’s attacks upon those with political leanings similar to Burns and 
Chase’s mysterious warning.  There is no hard evidence to support Burns’ accusations 
against the Secretary of War, to the contrary, logic argues against a conspiracy designed 
to remove the general.  Stanton was a busy man;  it is difficult to imagine when he had 
time to devise a plan to rid the field of a relatively low-profile general.  Burns idolized 
McClellan, but there is no reason to believe that the Secretary knew that;  Stanton does 
not appear to have had any prior interaction with Burns and, significantly, the general 
was not involved in the January revolt against Burnside.  For his part, Chase was known 
to be resentful of Stanton for reducing his influence in military matters.62 
 Burns was not the only nominee left disappointed when Congress adjourned that 
March.  Responding to a question from Hooker, Stanton explained that the “limitation 
imposed by the Act of Congress upon the number of Brigadier and Major Generals 
required an apportionment among the several armies in the field.”63  He considered it 
“inevitable” that “differences of opinion should exist as to the nominations made,” but 
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reassured Hooker that “the President exercised his best judgment with an anxious desire 
to do full justice to everyone . . . no one can have just ground of complaint.”64  It is far 
more likely that Burns fell victim to a numbers issue than it is that his name was 
deliberately withdrawn at Stanton’s request.   
 If this conclusion is valid, it becomes apparent that Burns chose the wrong course 
of action in submitting his resignation.  His friends advised him against such a move.  
Isaac Wistar, a former subordinate from the Philadelphia Brigade, wrote imploringly, “It 
is solely a feeling of affection and warm interest for you, that prompts me to write and 
beg you not to resign.”65  Wistar’s counsel was reasonable and wise, but came too late:  
“The President may still appoint you during the recess, perhaps, very soon, when your 
confirmation at the next session will be certain.  The war may last a long time yet, long 
enough for you to experience much regret at an irrevocable act.”66   
 Burns’ response is not known, but he was not dissuaded from submitting his 
resignation.  Historian Pieter Spierenburg writes of an “honor-and-shame culture”, in 
which men who are shamed have no alternative but to take whatever action necessary to 
restore their honor.67  Historian Elliott Gorn defines honor as “an intensely social 
concept...[it] requires  acknowledgement from others; it cannot exist in solitary 
conscience.”68  Stanton’s betrayal, as Burns saw it, damaged the officer’s good name, 
harming his reputation and his career with the implication that he was not worthy of 
promotion.  Historian Gerald Linderman explains that a soldier in that era “had to act so 
as to escape any imputation of dishonor.”69  With his reputation among his peers at 
stake, Burns reacted in an extreme manner, which could explain the language in his 
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letter of resignation, florid and near-hysterical even by the standards of the day.  He 
could not simply follow Wistar’s advice and wait for the next opportunity, keeping in 
mind that he was far from the only officer waiting for a promotion.  Caught in a swirling 
confluence of betrayal, disappointment, and outrage, Burns’ discipline failed him when 
he needed it the most, allowing an emotional eruption at a moment that called for 
objective detachment. 
Wistar’s next letter reflects his frustration with his stubborn former commander:  
“Pardon me for supposing that you ‘regulars’ get so accustomed to the rights of 
‘seniority’ that you treat violation of it with too much seriousness.”70  Furthermore, “I 
know that Mr. Stanton is not inimical to you.  He payed [sic] the greatest attention to 
your letter requesting me to be assigned to you – would not let my friend take it to the 
President, but insisted on doing it himself.”71  Wistar closed his letter with one final plea:  
“Now my dear friend let me implore you one more time to rise above this hot feeling.  
Fix your eyes on the great future.  It will vindicate you as well as some others of our 
friends.  No man ever had an unimpeded flight to greatness.”72  But Burns would not 
yield.  His mistrust of the Secretary of War, inflamed by his wounded pride and his 
feelings of shame, prevented him from seeing anything but Stanton, the antagonist of his 
friends. 
 Burns likely sealed his fate with the histrionic tone of his letter of resignation as a 
volunteer officer.  Claiming that “the humiliation has so broken my military spirit and 
my health, that now I’m ashamed and unable to assume command over men again,” was 
not the best phrasing to convince Lincoln and Stanton that his promotion deserved more 
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consideration and that he was healthy enough to withstand the rigors of leading a corps 
on campaign.73  No further field command would be forthcoming to a general who 
declared that his “want of self-reliance would involve disaster, and I will not hazzard 
[sic] the lives of brave men who would distrust me and fail.”74  This passage surely 
guaranteed that his resignation would be accepted.  Lincoln and Stanton had dealt with 
too many other touchy, paranoid generals to placate yet another, less important one.  
Burns’ timing could not have been worse, given what had taken place in the Army of the 
Potomac that January.  Compounding the error, Burns left the politicians the option of 
retaining his services in another important capacity by offering to return to the 
Commissary Department at his Regular Army rank.  The general overplayed his hand 
and paid for it with his career.  As an officer in the Regular Army, he returned to his 
former life as a major in the Commissary Department, sullenly serving out the war in 
obscurity in the Department of the Northwest.75 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 William Wallace Burns’ tale is a cautionary one, a lesson in the dangers of 
surrendering to paranoia and of overestimating one’s own importance.  He could have 
been one of the rising stars to emerge from the war, not yet forty years old when Lee and 
Grant met at Appomattox, a major general with demonstrated combat leadership ability 
and a scar on his cheek to prove his courage.  It is not difficult, given both his father’s 
connections and his own cultivated during the war, to imagine Burns embarking on a 
post-war political career, emulating fellow Ohioans James A. Garfield and Rutherford B. 
Hayes, who used similar credentials to run for Congress after the war, putting 
themselves on the road to the White House.  Whatever his post-war aspirations, Burns 
crippled himself with his ill-considered reaction to a crisis that existed only in his own 
mind.  No laurels would be thrown for the general who resigned his commission at the 
very height of his own nation’s struggle to survive.  He would be remembered, if at all, 
as a man who, in Ezra Warner’s dismissive words, “evidently preferred administration to 
field command,” a charitable way of saying he could not handle the rigors of combat.1 
 At the same time, Burns’ paranoia can be blamed upon the treacherous political 
environment that existed in the Army of the Potomac for the duration of the war.  
Radical Republicans, epitomized by Stanton and the Joint Committee on the Conduct of 
the War, turned a war to preserve the Union into a crusade against Southern slave-
holding aristocracy and were openly hostile to any officer who did not offer at least 
silent approval of their goals and methods.  While he does not appear to have been 
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specifically targeted by the Radicals, Burns knew his status as a conservative Democrat 
and a loyal supporter of George McClellan placed him in direct opposition to the 
crusaders and left him sensitive to any potential attacks from that direction.  The 
persecution of and accusations of treason against fellow Democrats in the Army of the 
Potomac cultivated such a sense of paranoia in Burns that he overreacted to the first 
perceived slight against him.  As Benjamin Thomas and Harold Hyman point out, “it 
never occurred to Edwin Stanton [or, apparently, to Abraham Lincoln] that a Secretary 
of War owed his officers greater protection from . . . overzealous congressmen than he 
accorded to [Democrat generals].”2  Had Burns enjoyed the confidence of such 
protection perhaps he would have followed the advice of his friend Isaac Wistar and 
returned to a division command until his name came up again for promotion instead of 
allowing the services of a talented combat leader to go to waste.3 
 Believing his reputation tarnished and his honor at stake, Burns spent the 
remainder of his life fighting for the promotion he considered unfairly denied.  Breveted 
back to his previous rank of brigadier general in 1865, he let the matter rest for a few 
years immediately following the war.  In 1874, apparently believing that he could elicit 
more sympathy from a fellow officer, he approached the Grant administration about 
revisiting his failed appointment to major general.  Orville E. Babcock, Grant’s personal 
secretary, took the matter to Secretary of War William Belknap, who investigated and 
reported finding “no record whatever, that I can discern in the War Department, relative 
to the appointment of General Burns as Major General.”4  Belknap concluded, “I hold in 
my hand all the papers that can be found on file in the War Department concerning the 
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case:  and am satisfied that [the War Department has made] a full statement of the whole 
matter.”5   
 Dismayed but not dissuaded, Burns saw new hope in the election to the 
presidency of his friend Garfield in 1880.  Unfortunately, Garfield was assassinated only 
a few months after his inauguration and Burns was reduced to invoking the deceased 
President’s name in an appeal to his successor, Chester A. Arthur.  “It is my hope,” 
Burns pleaded, “to remove the stain upon my record of having seemed to voluntarily 
leave the field, after having laid down the pen to take up the sword, in time of war, for 
which I was educated, when in fact I was forced out of the field.”6  What was worse, 
“my misfortune followed me into my department when a junior was placed over me.  I 
have no future unless the President place me, when a vacancy occurs, in the rank from 
which I was debarred.”7  If Arthur, who doubtless had other things on his mind in late 
1881, made any reply, Burns did not mention it. 
 Burns remained in the Commissary Department for the rest of his career, serving 
as chief commissary for various departments in the former Confederate states from 1865 
to 1868, filling in as the military mayor of Charleston, South Carolina, for a two week 
period in the spring of 1868, then transferring to a post as Purchasing Commissary of 
Subsistence in New York City until 1873.  Promoted to colonel in 1884 after spending 
time as chief commissary in the Department of the Pacific and purchasing commissary in 
Baltimore, Burns’ peacetime career reached its pinnacle with his assignment as chief 
commissary of the Division of the Atlantic and the Department of the East from 1884 to 
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1889.  On September, 3 1889, the sixty-four year old officer retired to private life;  his 
quest to become major general would remain unfulfilled.8 
 Burns pursued other interests both before and after his retirement, publishing 
articles on political, military, religious, and agricultural subjects.  He even dabbled in 
poetry with a piece titled “La Fille du Regiment.”  He tried his hand at public speaking, 
delivering an address before the Nation Agricultural Convention in Chicago in 1882 and 
another at a reunion of West Point graduates in 1888.  However, Burns’ health began to 
fade, he suffered from severe rheumatism that first struck in 1869 and plagued him for 
the rest of his life.  He apparently grew fond of South Carolina during his time there, 
moving there after his retirement.  He perhaps preferred the warm climate given the 
painful chills he complained of in his final decade.  Just before midnight, April 18, 1892, 
Burns’ daughter found him lying on his bedroom floor, a doctor was summoned, but the 
general was dead by the time he arrived.9 
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